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Summary
This dissertation uses detailed micro data to shed light on issues affecting decision making
in the administration of public resources. By helping to understand these dynamics, it
informs the design of more effective policies, which ultimately translates into an increase in
social welfare. In particular, it studies the role of cognitive limitations and social dynamics
on the collection and use of public resources. The analysis of this question is carried out
in three separate chapters, using administrative data at the sub-national level in a variety
of settings.
The first chapter analyzes the presence of interactions between economic agents on
the expenditure side of public finances. Specifically, it studies the presence of fiscal in-
teractions on the expenditure decisions of local governments in Colombia. The next two
chapters focus on the revenue side of public finances, and analyze the role of social norms
and cognitive limitations on individual compliance in two different settings. The second
chapter studies the role of intergenerational transmission of social norms on property tax
compliance in Argentina. Finally, the third chapter investigates the effect of salience and
information simplification on timely compliance for the payment of speeding tickets in the
Czech Republic.
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Preface
In recent decades, there has been a growing interest in empirical research in the
field of public economics regarding the implications of behavioral and social traits
in the interaction between government and individuals. This change of focus, from
a more traditional approach that assumes perfectly rational individuals, has had a
strong impact in the way economists understand key issues related to efficiency in
the administration of public resources, both on the revenue and expenditure side.
In turn, this has opened the door to innovative policy design that addresses these
behavioral and social dynamics.
From the revenue perspective, traditional economic analysis regards the compli-
ance decision process of taxpayers as a situation in which individuals trade off their
potential benefits, from not paying their due obligations, against the potential costs
if they are caught. This approach ignores many aspects of the process that influ-
ence compliance choices, and could lead to misleading conclusions. For instance,
behavioral biases, such as inattention, may cause individuals to make sub-optimal
compliance decisions. Likewise, existing social norms in the decision environment
can have a positive or a negative impact on the decisions of individuals depending
on the social norms to which they conform.
On the expenditure side, governments decide how to spend public resources com-
ing from taxes and other sources, taking into account their restrictions and objec-
tives. These decisions, however, may be affected by the actions of similar economic
actors, i.e. other governments, in the form of fiscal externalities. This is especially
relevant for sub-national levels of government, where actions taken by one local en-
tity might affect the decisions of the neighboring jurisdictions. These effects have
been widely analyzed on tax setting decisions. Usually, local governments compete
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to attract a mobile tax base by lowering their taxes, which leads to a ”race to the
bottom” on taxes, and thereby an inefficient provision of public goods. In contrast,
little is known about the presence of similar fiscal externalities on the expenditure
side, which is somewhat surprising, given its implications for efficiency in processes
of decentralization.
In this dissertation I use detailed micro data to shed light on these issues af-
fecting decision making in the administration of public resources. By helping to
understand these dynamics, I am contributing to inform the design of more effective
policies, which ultimately translates into an increase in social welfare. In particular,
I study the role of cognitive limitations and social dynamics on the collection and
use of public resources. I analyze this question in three separate chapters, using
administrative data at the sub-national level in a variety of settings.
The first chapter analyzes the presence of interactions between economic agents
on the expenditure side of public finances. Specifically, it studies the presence of
fiscal interactions on the expenditure decisions of local governments in Colombia.
The next two chapters focus on the revenue side of public finances, and analyze
the role of social norms and cognitive limitations on individual compliance in two
different settings. The second chapter studies the role of intergenerational trans-
mission of social norms on property tax compliance in Argentina. Finally, the third
chapter investigates the effect of salience and information simplification on timely
compliance for the payment of speeding tickets in the Czech Republic.
Chapter 1, written with Frank Fossen and Lukas Mergele, analyzes the extent
to which public expenditure decisions of a local government affect neighbors’ local
spending within a wide range of expenditure categories in Colombia. During recent
decades, there has been a wave of decentralization reforms in several developing
countries. The aim of these reforms has been to give more autonomy to local gov-
ernments in the administration of resources to improve efficiency. This opens the
door for potential local fiscal interactions.
Expenditure interactions may arise due to a variety of reasons, and can have
different effects on efficiency. Local politicians may engage in yardstick competition,
trying to prove their worth to their electorate by mimicking, or exceeding public
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expenditures in neighboring jurisdictions. Local governments can also engage in
expenditure competition to attract a mobile tax base through targeted expenditures.
These two mechanisms would result in positive fiscal interactions. Furthermore,
spillovers may arise because of the “public good” nature of the expenditures. In this
case the sign of the interactions differ if the goods are complements or substitutes.
We use detailed data covering different spending categories for a significant num-
ber of years to analyze the presence of expenditure spillovers between neighboring
municipalities in Colombia. In order to distinguish expenditure interactions from
spatial autocorrelation, and thus identify causal effects, we implement an instrumen-
tal variable approach that exploits exogenous variation in municipalities’ exposure
to changes in the world market price of oil, given the municipalities’ endowment
with oil resources.
We find significant spatial autocorrelations in total municipal spending, and also
in most expenditure categories. However, results from the instrumental variable
approach reveal that there are no causal fiscal interactions in spending between the
municipalities. Our results underscore the importance of using exogenous sources of
variation for the identification of spatial spillovers. From an applied policy perspec-
tive, the results indicate that decentralization did not lead to a race to the bottom
in public expenditures in our setting.
Chapter 2 turns to the revenue side of local finances and analyzes the role of social
norms on property tax compliance. In particular, it studies the intergenerational
transmission of social norms related to tax compliance in the city of Santa Fe in
Argentina. Even though there are numerous studies documenting the persistence
over time of various cultural traits, there is scarce evidence of the transmission of
social norms between generations. This is the first study analyzing the persistence
of social norms across more than two generations. Between the end of the 19th
century and the beginning of the 20th century, Argentina registered a significant
number of immigrants coming mostly from European countries. Thanks to this
particular migration history, today’s Argentinian population has a wide range of
ethnic origins. In particular, the city of Santa Fe captures this background diversity
very well, as it was the destination of a considerable number of migrants.
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I exploit the genealogical information contained in the surnames of present-day
individuals subject to property tax to identify the country of origin of their ancestors.
This information is then linked to administrative records on the amount and timing
of individual property tax payments and measures of wealth. This allows me to
study differences in compliance and economic performance by taxpayers’ country of
descent. Furthermore, I make use of information on indicators of tax morale and
unlawful behavior in the country of origin of the taxpayers’ ancestors. With this, I
explore correlations with present-day compliance of individuals with roots in those
countries.
Results document significant differences in property tax compliance between in-
dividuals with ancestry from a specific group of countries, indicating persistence of
social norms related to tax compliance. These results are robust to a wide range
of estimations from different specifications and within various periods of time. In
contrast, I do not find evidence of significant correlations between property tax
compliance and contemporary indicators of tax morale and unlawful behavior in
taxpayers ancestors’ country of origin. This is consistent with the convergence of
social values over time for groups of individuals with different ancestry in Argentina.
It is also in line with immigrants being self-selected on unobservables. Since they are
systematically different than the individuals that stayed in their country of origin,
so are the set of social norms that they transmit to future generations.
Chapter 3 was written with Libor Dusek and Christian Traxler. This chapter,
like Chapter 2, is related to the collection of revenue for local governments. It studies
the role of cognitive limitations on individuals’ choices regarding compliance with
payments in the presence of a deadline. Specifically, we analyze the effect of salience,
simplification, and economic incentives on compliance for speeding tickets.
We first explore individuals’ payment choice in a simple theoretical framework.
Individuals receive a payment notification and decide if and when to pay. Paying
after a deadline triggers an additional penalty which implies higher costs. Due to
the complexity of the payment notification, however, both the payment deadline
itself and the increased costs may not be fully salient. We discuss that a simplified
notification – that makes the deadline and the additional penalty more salient – can
increase timely payments. Effects from the letter depend, however, on the extent
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and direction of the individuals’ mis-perception of the deadline and the penalty for
missing it.
To test this prediction, we conduct a field experiment with of the universe of
speeding tickets recipients in a suburb of Prague, Czech Republic. The experiment
randomly varies the inclusion and content of a complementary cover letter attached
to the regular payment notification sent to speeders. All cover letters simplify the
main information from the legal text. In addition, they increase either the salience of
the payment deadline, the consequences of missing it, or both attributes. This setup
allows us to analyze the effect of the salience of these attributes on the individuals’
payments. In a next step, we further implement a regression discontinuity design to
identify how increasing the fine and the late-pay penalty affects payment behavior.
Results from the randomized control trial document a positive effect from simpli-
fication and penalty salience. Making the additional penalties for late payments more
salient increases timely compliance. Jointly increasing the salience of the deadline
and the penalty produces a larger effect on timely payments, and a persistent effect
on payments in general. Outcomes from the regression discontinuity design indicate
that increasing the size of the fine and the penalty for paying late reduces payments
before the deadline. A comparison of the absolute value of the effects from both
exercises reveals that changes in monetary incentives have a larger impact than the
salience intervention. From an applied policy perspective, the findings indicate that
information simplification and increasing the salience of decision-relevant attributes
is a cost-effective enforcement policy.
Chapter 1
Fueling Fiscal Interactions:
Commodity Price Shocks and
Local Government Spending in
Colombia
1.1 Introduction
In the past four decades, decentralization has been a focal point of policy reform
in many developing countries, including South American nations. Policy advisors
such as the World Bank and the OECD have advocated the delegation of more fiscal
autonomy concerning both public expenditures and revenues away from the central
government to local governments, including municipalities. More autonomy of local
governments opens up the possibility of local fiscal interactions.
To fully understand the consequences of decentralization, reliable estimates of
the extent of strategic fiscal interactions of local governments are crucial, because
strong interactions may imply externalities and therefore inefficiencies (e.g., Caldeira
et al., 2014). On the revenue side, tax competition has received considerable inter-
est and raised concerns that uncoordinated fiscal autonomy may lead to a race to
the bottom of tax revenues. Far less is known about local fiscal interactions on
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the expenditure side, especially in a developing country context.1 Strategic com-
petition in expenditures may differ from strategic tax competition (e.g., Wildasin,
1988), so existing empirical evidence on tax interactions does not necessarily carry
over to expenditure interactions. Despite the scarcity of evidence, local expenditure
spillovers are frequently discussed in policy debates. For example, local policymak-
ers are often concerned that too generous local welfare spending will draw in welfare
migrants from surrounding regions (see Figlio et al. (1999) for an analysis of welfare
competition at the level of US states). Neighboring regions may then save public
funds at the expense of the local taxpayers of the focal jurisdiction. Such consider-
ations may lead to an underprovision of certain public goods if local governments
are responsible.
Expenditure interactions may also arise if local policymakers engage in yardstick
competition and mimicking of peers.2 Understanding the way local governments
interact in terms of public expenditures is key for implementing development policies
which aim to improve local public spending. If local policymakers mimick their
neighbors, it might be effective to roll out an innovative budget composition in a
local jurisdiction that is used as a benchmark, i.e. that is central in the spillover
network. Then the expectation is that the policy spreads out to other regions.
If public expenditures are strategic complements, decentralized foreign aid to one
municipality may entail fiscal efforts in connected regions and trigger a multiplier
effect (Caldeira et al., 2014; Glaeser et al., 2003). Public expenditure interactions
may be very different for different types of expenditures. Therefore, it is important
to distinguish between various categories of local expenditures.
In this paper, we analyze spatial interactions of different types of local pub-
lic expenditures among municipalities in Colombia. Our data covers the universe
of the more than 1000 Colombian municipalities over eleven years from 2000 to
2010 and distinguishes between the eleven most important expenditure categories.
1As an illustration, Google Scholar finds 30,000 papers for “tax competition” but only around
600 results each for “expenditure competition” or “spending competition” (September 2016).
2The website of the mid-sized municipality Fresno in Colombia suggests that policymak-
ers compete locally: “Municipalities [...] must develop integral systems to generate resources
as well as social and economic development based on three basic variables: competitiveness,
productivity and employment. Competitiveness is understood as the capacity of the munici-
pality to differentiate itself from the surrounding municipalities to attract investments.” http:
//fresnoposible.fresnodigital.info/?page_id=56 (accessed 09/10/2016)
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Studying Colombia is highly informative because the country has undergone fiscal
decentralization reforms similar to those in many countries in South America and
the developing world. Colombia is also similar to many Latin American and other
developing countries in that they collect substantial royalties for the extraction of
natural resources and partly allocate them to subnational governments.
The methodological challenge in the literature on spatial spillovers in general and
local fiscal interactions in particular is the identification of causal spatial interaction
effects. These must be separated from spatial autocorrelation that is due to spatially
clustered unobservable factors (Manski, 1993; Gibbons and Overman, 2012; Revelli,
2015). For identification, we exploit the fact that Colombian municipalities receive
royalties that depend on revenues from local oil extraction by private companies.
Higher local oil revenues thus relax the budget constraint of a municipality and
allow an increase in local public spending. To identify expenditure spillovers, we
use exogenous variation in the exposure of municipalities to changing world market
prices for oil due to their endowments with oil resources (as measured before our time
period of analysis). With our spatial panel instrumental variable (IV) estimator, we
control for municipality fixed effects as well as department-specific time fixed effects.
This accounts for any cross-sectional differences between municipalities with and
without oil resources as well as regional business cycle effects while leaving changes
in world market prices of oil for exposed municipalities for identification. World
market prices for oil are arguably exogenous for Colombia as a relatively small oil
extracting country, which is not a member of OPEC, and certainly for Colombian
municipalities.
Our results indicate that spatial interactions of total local public expenditures
as well as local spending in almost all categories are small and not significantly
different from zero when identifying the spillover effects based on quasi-experimental
variation. The only exception is public spending for sport and recreation, where we
detect significant spatial interactions that can be interpreted as causal. In contrast,
when we use a spatial panel estimator without our additional source of exogenous
variation, as done in most of the literature, the results suggest large and significant
spatial autocorrelation in total local expenditures and almost all spending categories,
even when controlling for municipality and time fixed effects. However, most of these
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effects are spurious, as we show by comparison to the consistent estimation based on
the quasi-experimental instrument. Thus, the main methodological insight from our
analysis is that it is crucial to use additional sources of exogenous variation for the
identification of spatial fiscal interaction effects in a quasi-experimental approach.3
As spatial interactions are insignificant for total local public spending and most
expenditure types, the main policy insight from our paper is that policymakers do
not need to be overly concerned about a race to the bottom regarding local public
expenditures when pursuing decentralization reform in a developing country. On
the other hand, one should also not expect that innovative local expenditure poli-
cies spread out through mimicking in substantial ways. A potential caveat is that
transfers and royalties that municipalities in Colombia receive are partly earmarked
for spending in specific categories. This might limit the scope for expenditure inter-
actions in Colombia, although we discuss below that Colombian local policymakers
seem to have significant leeway.
Our approach and results contribute to a small body of emerging literature that
employs quasi-experimental sources of variation for identification in the context of
spatial fiscal interactions. Concerning expenditure spillovers, Baicker (2005) uses
variation in federally-mandated increases in Medicare spending at the state level in
the United States, and Isen (2014) employs referendum decisions in counties and mu-
nicipalities in Ohio. While the former author reports considerable spatial spillovers,
the latter does not find any significant interaction effects using his identification
strategy. We largely confirm the last result in a developing country context and
based on a very different source of exogenous variation, but also show that causal
fiscal interaction effects can be identified for the category of sport and recreation.
In the context of tax competition, the literature using quasi-experimental ap-
proaches has developed more rapidly. Lyytika¨inen (2012) uses changes in minimum
property tax rates in Finland for identification, and Baskaran (2014) a fiscal equaliza-
tion reform in Germany. Both authors report that seemingly large tax interactions
become insignificant when using quasi-experimental variation for identification, sim-
ilar to the result of Isen (2014) concerning public expenditures. Other papers that
identify fiscal effects at borders of higher level jurisdictions or language regions re-
3Spatial discontinuity designs also fulfill this request.
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port significant strategic tax interactions (Eugster and Parchet, 2013; Parchet, 2014;
Agrawal, 2015; Agrawal, 2016). It remains unclear whether the inconclusiveness in
the spatial tax interactions literature using additional exogenous variation is due to
the different institutional settings analyzed or whether it can be explained by differ-
ences between the quasi-experimental and spatial discontinuity approaches. Revelli
(2015) mentions that by dropping municipalities with low tax rates from his analy-
sis, Lyytika¨inen (2012) may have excluded the municipalities most likely to respond
to tax competition pressures, which could explain his finding of no interactions.4
Most of the literature on spatial fiscal interactions does not use quasi-experimental
variation. While that literature is fairly large in the context of tax competition, not
many papers exist on public expenditure spillovers. Case et al. (1993) provide an
analysis at the level of US states. Analyzing spillovers at the municipality-level
provides a much larger policy variation compared to the state- or department-level
mostly employed in the literature (e.g., Baicker, 2005). Moreover, most papers only
analyze few expenditure categories or solely focus on single budgetary items such
as health expenditures (Moscone et al., 2007). Borck et al. (2007) are among the
few authors who use municipality data and distinguish between various spending
categories, although only cross-sectionally.
The literature on fiscal interactions largely ignores developing countries since
large and complete fiscal policy datasets rarely exist in these regions. It is impor-
tant to investigate developing countries separately because they are in the focus of
decentralization reform efforts. Additionally, they differ from developed countries
in their forms of decentralization and institutional as well as budgetary constraints.
Akin et al. (2005) investigate health care budgets in less than 30 districts in Uganda
4To further investigate whether the identification approach influences results within the same
country and institutional setting, it would be interesting to compare our approach using quasi-
experimental variation between municipalities with an approach using spatial discontinuities at
the borders of higher-level jurisdictions. In principle, Colombia could be suitable for such a com-
parison as departments also receive royalties from the exploitation of natural resources, potentially
providing a spatial discontinuity setting. However, institutional details complicate such an analy-
sis because departments near oil producing departments may also receive a share of the royalties
(“escalonamiento”). At the municipal level, a similar mechanism rarely applies and if so, it af-
fects all municipalities within the same department. In our approach we can account for this by
using a control variable (transfers) and department-time fixed effects. Furthermore, departments
have much less autonomy than municipalities regarding taxes and public expenditures in Colombia
(Bird, 2012). Given the institutional and data issues, a spatial discontinuity approach is not within
the scope of this paper, but might be an interesting avenue for future research.
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and Arze del Granado et al. (2008) local public spending based on cross-sectional
data from Indonesia. Agostini et al. (2016) and Yu et al. (2016) analyze spatial
spending interactions in China. Caldeira et al. (2014) use a panel of 77 communes
in Benin and report strategic complementarity of local public spending. The sig-
nificant fiscal externalities found in Caldeira et al. (2014) question the efficiency of
decentralization reform in developing countries. In contrast to our paper, the ex-
isting literature in the developing country context does not use quasi-experimental
variation for identification and may therefore overestimate expenditure interactions.5
Our paper is also related to studies using an identification strategy similar to
ours based on Colombian data. Mart´ınez (2016) shows that local governments in
Colombia perform better in providing public goods if more revenues come from their
own taxes rather than oil royalties. He exploits exogenous variation in oil revenues
for identification. Dube and Vargas (2013) investigate effects of income on civil
conflict in Colombia using commodity price shocks.
This paper proceeds as follows: The next section reviews the theoretical litera-
ture, while Section 1.3 introduces the relevant Colombian context. Sections 1.4 and
1.5 present the data and empirical strategy before we discuss our results in Section
1.6. Section 1.7 concludes the analysis.
1.2 Theory of expenditure interactions
There are at least four different reasons why expenditures might be linked among
municipalities. First, yardstick competition (Shleifer, 1985; Besley and Case, 1995)
may induce local politicians to mimic their neighbors’ policies. This is because voters
can assess the quality of their incumbent politician only by observing policies in
neighboring jurisdictions. The theory was originally developed to explain spillovers
in local tax-setting and has been subject to vast empirical tests (see Allers and
Elhorst (2005) for an overview). The mechanism may also apply to local public
spending and result in positive interactions among local expenditures. Yardstick
competition might be particularly relevant in developing countries with elected local
5Yu et al. (2016) find spatial interactions within, but not across Chinese provinces, which
supports their conclusion that Chinese local leaders engage in tournament competition.
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governments like Colombia because information problems are likely to be comparably
severe.6
Second, expenditures may be linked due to competition for attracting a mobile
tax base as suggested by Tiebout-type models (Tiebout, 1956). For instance, mu-
nicipalities could compete for company settlements or highly-skilled workers (Borck
et al., 2007) by investing in their communication infrastructure or education system.
In this case, the interjurisdictional spending is positively correlated. The classic
model of fiscal spillovers by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) shows how local gov-
ernments competing for mobile capital will underinvest in public services. Keen and
Marchand (1997) argue that non-coordinated spending of local governments under
tax competition may be downward biased relative to the efficient level. They also
posit that the underprovision of public consumption-oriented investment compared
to public production inputs is relatively more pronounced. This is because capital
is assumed to be more mobile than households and thus receives a more favorable
treatment by the government.
A third explanation for expenditure interactions is the externality-producing na-
ture of public investments (Case et al., 1993), which may either be substitutes or
complements to spendings in other regions. The sign of the correlation implied by
this channel is ambiguous: On the one hand, a neighboring hospital might be suffi-
cient to fulfill the regional demand for health services, making additional investment
in another hospital obsolete. Investments then are substitutes and expected to be
negatively correlated among neighbors. On the other hand, if a road construction
project is supposed to link two municipalities, public local investments are likely
to be complementary and positive expenditure interactions are expected. Hence,
investments likely differ in their external effects, which is why we study different
spending categories separately.
A fourth potential mechanism that could lead to horizontal interactions between
municipalities is competition for bailouts (Baskaran, 2012). Municipal governments
may believe that a higher level government authority might bail them out in case of
an imminent insolvency, but that a budget constraint at this higher level might limit
6Faguet and Sa´nchez (2013) conclude that decentralization reform has made Colombian mayors
more accountable.
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the scope for bailouts. A municipality’s chances of a bailout and thus incentives to
spend and incur debt then depend on other municipalities’ expenditure and debt
levels, which would lead to horizontal interactions. Municipalities in Colombia are
allowed to incur debt, and this led to municipal debt problems in the 1990s. However,
reforms in 1997 and 2000 introduced strong borrowing and bailout restrictions for
subnational governments, which led to a sizable municipal debt reduction (Villar
et al., 2013). Therefore, bailout expectations may not be as relevant in Colombia in
our period of analysis as they might have been before.
The first two mechanisms discussed above would lead to positive interactions in
local expenditures. The third and forth mechanisms would lead to nonzero inter-
actions, but the sign is ambiguous in these cases. Using data from German federal
states, Baskaran (2012) estimates that bailout competition leads to positive inter-
actions as well.
Fiscal competition in developing countries may differ from the case of developed
economies usually studied. Caldeira et al. (2014) emphasize that poor municipalities
in developing countries may be restricted in their spending choices. They develop a
model of expenditure competition with a constrained Nash equilibrium. One impli-
cation of the model is that there may be no strategic interactions despite positive
externalities if the level of fiscal resources is insufficient. However, for the case of
Benin, the authors empirically find significant positive strategic interactions. Colom-
bia is a developing country (GDP per capita: US$6,056), but less constrained than
Benin (GDP per capita: US$762)7, so we expect to find nonzero fiscal interactions
in Colombia as well.
Spatial expenditure reactions may depend on the source of funds used to finance
local spending. In Colombia, transfers municipalities receive from the central gov-
ernment as well as royalties from the extraction of natural resources are partially
earmarked for spending in specific categories such as education, as detailed in the
next section. Basic theory suggests that earmarking should not have practical rele-
vance, because local governments can reallocate other funds and adapt other tax and
spending decisions to offset the intended allocation. Thus, a block grant nominally
earmarked for a certain category should have the same effect as a general increase in
7Figures for 2015, given in current USD and retrieved from World Bank (2017).
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local taxpayers’ income of the same amount (see Smart, 2007, for an overview on the
incentive effects of grants). However, the empirical literature provides evidence that
block grants are disproportionately used for public spending rather than for tax cuts
and also tend to stick to the spending category they are intended for, a phenomenon
known as the flypaper effect (e.g. Hines and Thaler, 1995; Inman, 2008). If ear-
marking in practice limits the freedom of municipalities in their spending decisions,
this may attenuate the scope for expenditure interactions between municipalities in
Colombia.
In summary, from the theory we expect to find nonzero and most likely positive
expenditure interactions between municipalities in Colombia, although interactions
might be smaller than in fully developed economies or in settings with fewer insti-
tutional constraints.
1.3 Fiscal policy in Colombian municipalities
Colombia has been a politically, administratively and fiscally centralized country
throughout most of its history. However, as many other Latin American countries,
Colombia phased in important policies towards decentralization starting from the
mid 1980s (Acosta and Bird, 2005; Alesina et al., 2005; Chaparro et al., 2005). The
goal of the reforms was to delegate more functions to lower tiers of government,
namely Colombia’s 32 departments and more than 1000 municipalities. To this
end, in 1991, a new constitution introduced a number of provisions regarding the
delegation of administrative and fiscal duties from the central to the lower tiers of
government. Among them were increases in the amount of transfers to local and
regional governments and rules on how to spend these resources. In 2001, a unified
system to transfer the resources to the lower tiers of government called General
System of Participations (SGP by its initials in Spanish) was created.
In fiscal terms, these reforms have made the municipal sector the most important
subnational level of government in Colombia (Acosta and Bird, 2005). Municipal-
ities possess three main sources of income. First, municipalities obtain the afore-
mentioned transfers from the central government. Second, municipalities have their
own revenues coming from local taxes, mainly the property tax and the ICA tax (a
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tax on industrial and commercial activities). Third, municipalities receive royalties
from the exploitation of natural resources. Each source accounts roughly for 50%,
30%, and 5% of the total amount received by the municipalities respectively (Bonet
et al., 2014). The remaining revenue comes from non-tax income such as capital
dividends, leased property or fees from construction permits.
Royalties from oil extraction are particularly relevant for this analysis as we use
them as our source of exogenous variation. In Colombia, private companies extract
oil and pay a fixed share of their oil revenues (in Colombian Pesos) as royalties
according to this formula:
Royaltyi,t = outputi,t×world market pricet× exchange ratet× fixed royalty rate
(1)
The municipalities where the oil was extracted (as well as oil ports) receive a
share of these royalties according to a fixed schedule defined by law with rates
decreasing in local oil output. For those municipalities extracting oil or with an
oil port, royalties are very important, accounting on average for 23% of their total
revenues.8 Oil is the most important natural resource in Colombia and accounts for
69% of total royalties, followed by coal with 23% (Mart´ınez, 2016).
There are several rules on how to spend the revenues from the different sources
of income. According to a law introduced in 20019, 4% of the federal SGP transfers
were to be used for special purposes like food programs in schools or indigenous
reservations. Of the remaining 96%, 58.5% had to be used for education, 24.5%
for health, and 17% for a general purpose category, including water and sanitation,
housing, and agricultural investments, among other items. In 2007 a new change
in the legislation10 gave continuity to the transfers’ system, marginally modified the
growth rate of the transfers to each category, separated water and sanitation from
8We use the term royalties to refer to direct royalties, i.e. royalties that directly go to the
oil extracting municipalities. An oil extracting municipality with average (or median) oil output
receives 32% of the total local oil royalties and the department receives 52% in this case. An-
other 8% are allocated to municipalities with oil harbors. The National Royalty Fund distributes
the remaining oil royalties (indirect royalties) to municipalities that apply for specific investment
projects and get approved (Bird, 2012). Our control variable “transfers” also accounts for these
indirect royalties.
9Law 715, 2001
10Law 1176, 2007
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the general purpose category and assigned it 5.4% (leaving 11.6% for general pur-
poses). After the allocation of the transfers to the different categories, the ministries
in charge distribute them between the municipalities. In terms of own revenue, mu-
nicipalities have almost complete freedom to spend the money they collect in taxes.
The only provision in this regard is a minor mandatory contribution to the regional
environmental agency.
Concerning expenditure of direct royalties from the exploitation of natural re-
sources, legislation mandates that municipalities spend at least 75% in the achieve-
ment of coverage goals for health and child mortality, education, and water and
sanitation.11 In the following, we refer to the corresponding spending categories
health, education and water as earmarked categories. If all the goals are achieved,
local governments can use all the royalty revenues as desired.
The rules on how certain revenue types have to be spent could restrict spending
decisions and limit the potential for expenditures interaction across municipalities
(Bird and Smart, 2002). However, the evidence shows that local governments in
Colombia possess considerable leeway in the composition of their spending. Drazen
and Eslava (2010) demonstrate that incumbents increase expenditure in public goods
that are more visible to citizens in a bid to increase their vote shares before elec-
tions. According to Sa´nchez et al. (2004, p. 3), municipalities may relocate their
own-source revenues to circumvent conditionalities and conclude that “there is con-
siderably more fungibility in grants than a strict reading of the law would suggest”.
Thus, municipalities can direct some of their investments according to their own de-
sires, leaving the door open for expenditure interactions between local governments.
Nevertheless, according to Perotti (2005), the central government’s attempt to
force municipalities to spend disproportionately more on categories such as health
and education has prevented local governments from using resources in other areas
like social programs that might have had a larger impact on local poverty reduc-
tion and therefore on the welfare of individuals. By identifying categories of public
spending where local governments in Colombia compete, our paper informs policy-
makers which spending areas local governments are focusing on, in turn revealing
11The minimum coverage goals for health, child mortality, education, and water are respectively:
100% of health insured population, less than 1% of child mortality before reaching the second year
of life, 90% of school enrollment, and 70% of the population with access to clean water.
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local electorates’ preferences.
The case of Colombia is informative in a more general context because many
developing countries, especially in Latin America, implement similar institutions
regarding royalties from natural resources and their allocation to subnational gov-
ernments. According to Viale and Cruzado (2012), Bolivia, Brazil and Peru allocate
a share of income of extractive industries directly to subnational governments, as
Colombia does. Ecuador and Venezuela also use payments from the exploitation of
natural resources to compensate producing regions. In all the countries mentioned,
there are restrictions on how the income from the extraction of natural resources
may be used. Otto et al. (2006) note that it is standard practice in most African
and Asia-Pacific countries to levy royalties on mineral extraction.
1.4 Data
To pursue our analysis of spatial interactions in municipal spending, we require
four types of data: Public spending data at the local level, varying over time and
across municipalities; information on municipalities’ oil extraction; time-series data
on world market oil prices; and cross-sectional geo-information on the municipalities’
locations to construct spatial weighting matrices.
We retrieve local public spending data from the Center for Studies on Economic
Development (CEDE) of the University de los Andes, which in turn collected the in-
formation from government agencies. The data contain a wide range of government-
related variables from the full universe of Colombian municipalities over the years
1993 to 2013. This dataset has previously been used to analyze the effects of fiscal
decentralization (Soto et al., 2012), income shocks (Dube and Vargas, 2013) and
political stability (Acemoglu et al., 2013b), among other studies. As full coverage
is not given for all years and to avoid large differences in the institutional setting,
we focus on the period between 2000 and 2010. This results in a strongly balanced
panel of 1093 municipalities over eleven years. The data allow us to differentiate
between eleven major spending categories at the municipality level. We express all
variables in real per capita Colombian Pesos (COP) with the base year 2008 if not
stated otherwise.
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Figure 1.1a shows the largest expenditure categories in terms of their average
shares in total local public spending. About 31% of a municipalities’ expenditures go
into the area of health. Spending in water and basic sanitation as well as in education
account for another 17% and 14%, respectively. The remaining funds are spent on
sport and recreation, housing, attention to vulnerable groups, municipal facilities,
agriculture, disaster prevention, community development, justice and security as well
as further smaller categories. Figure 1.1b shows that there was an increase in local
real expenditures since the year 2000, mirroring the Colombian decentralization
process. Table 1.7 in Appendix 1.8 describes the spending categories in more detail
and provides some examples.
Note: Relative shares of spending types per
capita, averaged over 2000-2010.
(a) Relative shares of expenditure categories
Note: Annual averages across categories,
2000-2010.
(b) Expenditure levels over time
Figure 1.1: Local public expenditures of Colombian municipalities
The data are very complete and have an exceptionally high quality for a devel-
oping country context. We did not detect systematic trends of missing values and
had to impute less than 3% of the observations by linear intrapolation (see Ap-
pendix 1.8). From CEDE, we also retrieve the total transfers to municipalities from
the central government and other sources and the municipalities’ total and rural
population.
We retrieve information on oil extraction by private companies within a munici-
pality from the Ministry of Finance. To get an exogenous indicator of oil extraction,
we create a binary variable equaling one if oil was extracted on a municipality’s soil
at any time during the years 1990 to 1999, the decade preceding our analysis.
To obtain a measure of the value of the oil extracted, we use the oil basket price
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in USD provided by OPEC. According to Colombian law,12 the exchange rate used
to calculate the value of the royalties is the average of the daily official exchange
rate between the USD and the COP calculated by the Financial Superintendence of
Colombia. Thus, we convert oil prices into COP applying the official exchange rate.
Finally, we collect the cross-sectional geographical information on municipalities
from the Colombian Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi (IGAC).
Table 1.1 summarizes descriptive statistics of the major variables from the final
sample. Figure 1.2 depicts the spatial distribution of local total public expenditures
in Colombian municipalities and suggests spatial clustering. In our econometric
analysis we investigate whether this is due to causal expenditure interactions.
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. dev.
Total Expenditures 507.92 441.15
Health 158.87 89.92
Water and Basic Sanitation 85.84 137.99
Education 71.46 101.10
Housing 14.05 32.87
Sport and Recreation 13.99 23.53
Agriculture 12.77 22.40
Municipal Facilities 12.32 29.90
Attention to Vulnerable Groups 10.60 17.08
Justice and Security 5.59 12.45
Disaster Prevention 3.99 14.21
Community Development 1.72 7.94
Federal Transfers 390.42 268.46
Oil production status (1990-99) 0.06 0.24
Population in thousand inhabitants 39.08 235.98
Rural population share 582.27 236.14
Notes: The table provides averages over the entire sample period 2000-
2010. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in thousand
2008 COP. N = 1093 municipalities.
12Law 141 of 1994, law 756 of 2002.
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(550, 6090]
(398, 550]
(303, 398]
[106, 303]
No data
Figure 1.2: Total expenditures per capita in thousand COP by quartiles in 2005.
In all the figures, “no data” refers to entities not used in our analysis, see Appendix
1.8.
1.5 Empirical strategy
1.5.1 Model of spatial expenditure interaction
To estimate the effect of neighboring municipalities’ expenditures on the spending
of the focal municipality, we consider the following model:
Yi,d,t = δWY + η oili × poilt +WXθ +Xi,tβ + αi + τd,t + εi,d,t (2)
where Yi,d,t is the natural log of local public spending per capita (total spending
or one of the spending categories) in municipality i of department d in year t.
WY denotes the spending in neighboring municipalities (total or in the respective
category), where W is a spatial weighting matrix. The coefficient of interest is the
spatial autocorrelation coefficient δ, which measures potential spatial interaction
effects. The dummy oili equals 1 if oil was exploited within a municipality between
1990 and 1999. poilt is the natural log of the world market price of oil converted to
real COP. The interaction of the previous two variables captures differential effects
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of oil price changes on oil endowed and non-endowed municipalities primarily due to
the receipt of royalties. The vector Xi,t collects additional time-variant covariates:
Total spending of a municipality on all categories other than the focal category Y ,
population of the municipality and its square, the local share of the rural population,
and transfers from higher levels of government (including indirect royalties). We also
include the spatial lagsWX of allX variables (Spatial Durbin Model). This accounts
for the possibility that changes in neighboring municipalities such as population
growth directly influence a focal municipality’s spending. Municipality fixed-effects
αi capture time-invariant unobserved factors such as the distance to the capital,
geographical size and climatic conditions. Department-year fixed effects τd,t control
time variation that affects all municipalities within a department in the same way
such as regional economic shocks and changes in department-level regulations and
funding.
1.5.2 Oil price shocks as exogenous variation in local spend-
ing
In Equation (2), WY is endogenous due to the simultaneous influence of neighboring
municipalities on one another. Furthermore, unobserved factors that change over
time with variation within departments are contained both inWY and the error term
εi,d,t. To deal with this endogeneity, our empirical strategy employs an instrumental
variable approach that isolates exogenous variation in municipal spending.
Similar to Acemoglu et al. (2013a), we exploit oil price shocks that affect the
finances of some but not all municipalities. We do so by combining information
on oil endowments of municipalities with variation in oil prices on the world market
over time to extract quasi-experimental variation in spending changes of neighboring
municipalities.
In the 2SLS estimation, the first stage is given by
WY = γ oili × poilt +Woil × poilt λ+WXκ+Xi,tρ+ αfi + τ fd,t + ϑi,d,t (3)
where neighboring oil endowment (in the 1990s, before the period of analysis) inter-
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acted with current international oil prices in real COP (Woil × poilt ) is used as the
instrument for neighboring spending.
The validity of the instrument relies on two requirements. First, the combination
of oil endowment and oil prices must be correlated with local spending (instrument
relevance). Oil prices are linked to local spending as Colombian municipalities re-
ceive royalties from oil extracted on their soil, relaxing their budget constraint.
Federal law mandates royalty payments depend on extracted quantities as well as
current world market prices (see Section 1.3). Figure 1.3 suggests that oil production
in the 1990s (Panel a) corresponds well with oil royalty income in the middle of our
period of analysis (Panel b). Therefore we expect the instrument to be relevant for
total local public expenditures and its components. To obtain a strong instrument,
the movements of the global oil price must provide sufficient variation to substan-
tially influence spending of oil-endowed municipalities. Depicting the evolution over
time, Figure 1.4 illustrates that oil prices were highly volatile over the sample period
and, thus, introduce plenty of variation.
Oil extraction
No oil extraction
No data
(a) Municipalities producing oil (1990-1999)
(0.357, 0.904]
(0.084, 0.357]
[0.003, 0.084]
No oil extraction
No data
(b) Shares in municipal income coming from
oil royalties by terciles conditional on positive
oil royalties (2005)
Figure 1.3: Geography of oil production and municipal oil revenues
Concerning single expenditure categories, municipalities are supposed to spend
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Figure 1.4: Oil price in 2008 real COP (OPEC basket)
75% of the royalties for the earmarked categories health, education and water as long
as coverage goals have not been achieved, as explained in Section 1.3. Therefore,
we expect the instrument to be strong for the earmarked categories. As mentioned
before, royalties can potentially also be used for expenditures in non-earmarked
categories, so we test the strength of the instruments for these categories as well.
Statistical tests of the strength of the instrument are satisfactory for total expendi-
tures and the earmarked categories but not for most non-earmarked categories; we
discuss this in more detail in Section 1.6.1.
The second requirement for a valid instrument is that conditional on the covari-
ates included, the IV must not correlate with the error term in the second stage (exo-
geneity assumption). As we control for municipality fixed effects, time-invariant dif-
ferences between oil-endowed municipalities and other municipalities are accounted
for. The spatial distribution of oil reserves is not under the control of local govern-
ments. Potentially endogenous efforts in oil discovery do not affect our identification
because we use oil extraction indicators from 1990 to 1999, the decade preceding our
period of analysis. Moreover, municipalities cannot manipulate the extracted quan-
tities as private companies negotiate drilling contracts with the central government.
Federal law regulates the royalties paid to the municipalities. Regarding the oil price
on the world market, municipalities in Colombia are price takers. Although crude
oil is the country’s most important export good, Colombia does not rank among the
major exporting nations and is not part of OPEC.
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The spatial lag of a municipality’s total expenditures (excluding the focal cate-
gory Y ) is a potentially important control variable, because oil royalties received by
neighboring municipalities are likely to influence their spending not only in the focal
category but also in other categories. If these other spatially lagged expenditures
were omitted from the regression, our instrument could potentially be correlated
with the error term in the second stage equation. In Section 1.6.3, we explore the
sensitivity of our results when we treat total expenditures and its spatial lag as
endogenous and when we include spending in all categories and their spatial lags
separately in the regression.
In Table 1.2, we assess the structural similarity of oil-endowed and non-endowed
municipalities using an additional source of data, the Colombian census conducted
in 2005. The comparison shows that the two groups of municipalities are observa-
tionally equivalent concerning demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The
good balance indicates that both municipality types are very similar except for their
oil endowments, which supports our identification strategy. Figure 1.3a depicts the
two groups of municipalities within a map of Colombia. This map reveals that oil
extracting municipalities are somewhat clustered but sufficiently scattered over the
country to obtain broad coverage of our instrument.
Table 1.2: Treatment - Control Balance in Observables
Mean t-test
Variable Endowed Non-endowed p-value
Poverty rate 0.69 0.69 0.92
Informal employment share 0.95 0.95 0.51
Economic dependence share 0.54 0.54 0.81
Illiteracy share 0.28 0.29 0.46
Child labor share 0.06 0.06 0.59
Children w/o access to education, share 0.14 0.13 0.54
Children w/o access to care services share 0.21 0.20 0.56
Household share w/o health insurance 0.28 0.30 0.35
Household share w/o access to health 0.09 0.09 0.42
Household share w/o access to clean water 0.36 0.37 0.66
Household share w/o a sewage system 0.31 0.34 0.21
Household share w/o floors 0.19 0.21 0.27
Household share w/o walls 0.07 0.07 0.63
Notes.– All rates and shares refer to the households within a municipality. A municipality is
defined as endowed if oil was extracted on its soil at any time between 1990 and 1999. Means
are unweighted averages across municipality groups. The table shows p-values for t-tests of equal
means between the two groups. Variables based on the Colombian 2005 census (cross-section).
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Our estimation approach differs from the traditional spatial IV estimator. The
latter uses all spatially lagged covariates WX to instrument the neighboring endoge-
nous variable WY, in our case spending (see Anselin, 2008, for an overview). How-
ever, whether all WX can be excluded from the second stage equation is questionable
(Gibbons and Overman, 2012; Revelli, 2015). For example, population changes in
neighboring municipalities may well have a direct effect on spending decisions of the
focal municipality or be correlated with spatially clustered time-varying unobserved
factors, which would invalidate the traditional instruments. Therefore, we safely
control for all WX in the second stage equation. The only excluded instrument
is the interaction term of oil endowment of neighboring municipalities before the
observation period with the international oil price. As we control for the interaction
of the oil endowment dummy of the focal municipality with the oil price as well as
municipality and department-time fixed effects in the second stage, the argument of
exogeneity of this selected instrument is very strong. In Section 1.6.2, we compare
the results from our preferred IV estimator with those from the arguably inconsistent
traditional IV estimator.
To construct the spatial weighting matrix, we use the 5-nearest neighbor (NN)
criterion as our main approach because the average municipality has five neighbors.
As robustness checks, we compare the results to estimations using 4-NN and 6-NN
matrices and an economic proximity matrix based on municipalities’ average per
capita income. To safeguard against potentially remaining serial correlation in the
error term even after eliminating the unobserved fixed effects, we report standard
errors clustered at the municipal level throughout the paper.
We contrast our IV results with the traditional spatial econometric estima-
tors that use the Quasi Maximum-Likelihood method to estimate fiscal spillovers
(Anselin, 2010). We follow the model selection procedure suggested by Elhorst
(2010). Starting from OLS and going through the Spatial Lag (SAR), Spatial Error
(SEM) and Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), we test hypotheses on whether and what
kind of spatial terms should be included. The tests indicate that the SDM is the pre-
ferred model and thus confirm our initial model choice.13 Thus, we estimate Equa-
13Detailed results are available from the authors on request.
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tion (2) by QML, but without the oil-related variables.14 For the QML-estimation
to be consistent, knowledge of the true data generating process including the spatial
weights must be assumed, as criticized by Gibbons and Overman (2012). Therefore,
we prefer our IV estimator and present results from the potentially inconsistent
QML estimator for comparison only.
1.6 Empirical results
1.6.1 Results based on the quasi-experimental instrument
Table 1.3 reports the main (second stage) results from estimations of Equation (2)
using our preferred IV estimator. In this table we present estimates for total local
public expenditures, the three categories earmarked for spending royalty income, all
non-earmarked categories combined, as well as the specific non-earmarked category
sport and recreation. The first row contains the estimated parameter of interest δ,
which captures spatial public spending interaction. Our results indicate no signif-
icant spatial interactions in total expenditures, the earmarked categories, and the
non-earmarked categories combined. The point estimate of spatial interactions for
total local public spending is particularly close to zero (-0.081). The exception is the
category of local public spending for sport and recreation, where local governments
respond significantly to spending decisions of neighboring municipalities; we discuss
this result in more detail below.
The control variables confirm expectations. Higher total expenditure as a mea-
sure of a municipality’s budget (excluding the focal spending category to avoid endo-
geneity) increases spending in the focal category as well. Similarly, higher transfers
from higher levels of government increase total spending and spending in all cat-
egories. When the population in a municipality grows, total public expenditures
14Moreover, for computational reasons, the year fixed effects are not department-specific in the
QML estimations. This does not drive our results, though, because the IV estimates remain similar
if we use country-level instead of department-level year fixed effects, see Section 1.6.3. In order to
make our IV and QML estimations comparable, we report estimations based on the same sample
in our tables. Therefore, we do not apply the bias corrected QML estimator suggested by Lee and
Yu (2010) because this would imply losing one year of observations. However, we obtain similar
results when implementing the bias correction. The small impact of the bias correction can be
explained by our relatively large sample size.
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Table 1.3: Main Estimation Results of Expenditure Interactions
Total Health Education Water Non-earmarked Sport & rec.
W y -0.081 -0.140 0.282 0.358 0.492 1.257**
(0.499) (0.540) (0.238) (0.413) (0.663) (0.576)
Oil extraction x oil price 0.302*** 0.405*** 0.921*** 0.505*** -0.277** -0.185
(0.080) (0.117) (0.135) (0.157) (0.115) (0.129)
Total excl. y 0.260*** 0.418*** 0.587*** 0.108*** 0.555***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030)
W total excl. y 0.087 -0.059 -0.147 -0.047 -0.702**
(0.129) (0.114) (0.261) (0.076) (0.303)
Population 6.175*** 4.625 16.350*** -7.207** 0.808 0.003
(2.359) (3.373) (4.668) (3.001) (3.168) (3.823)
Population squared -2.996*** -2.120 -7.159*** 3.191** -0.768 -0.287
(1.088) (1.564) (2.161) (1.402) (1.482) (1.781)
Share of rural population -0.596*** -0.377** -1.147*** 0.027 -0.182 0.139
(0.144) (0.166) (0.244) (0.164) (0.176) (0.165)
Transfers 0.029*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
W population 0.444 -2.140 -10.329 1.750 0.166 -4.647
(5.820) (6.037) (8.862) (6.878) (6.885) (8.744)
W population squared 0.136 1.119 5.378 -0.628 0.294 2.520
(2.678) (2.806) (4.028) (3.189) (3.336) (4.173)
W share of rural population -0.508 -0.082 -0.637 0.177 0.003 0.086
(0.430) (0.428) (0.516) (0.408) (0.357) (0.334)
W transfers 0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.016 -0.004 -0.014*
(0.018) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.026) (0.009)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
Number of municipalitites 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department - year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP F-statistic excl. inst. 16.26 22.25 83.01 24.09 9.035 13.99
Notes: Second stage IV estimation results of spatial expenditure interactions. The columns show results for different local public
expenditure variables Y. Excluded IV for WY : Endowment of neighboring municipalities with oil in the 1990s interacted with
the current world market price for oil. 5-NN spatial weighting matrix. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in
2008 COP. All continuous variables in logs. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is also
reported. Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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increase, but at decreasing marginal rates, which is likely due to economies of scale.
A larger share of rural population decreases local public spending.
The F-statistic of excluded instruments is sufficiently large in all columns of this
table except for the non-earmarked composite. Table 1.4 presents the corresponding
first stage results in more detail. As expected, the interaction of oil extraction of
neighboring municipalities with the oil price is positive and highly significant when
total spending or the earmarked spending categories of the neighboring municipali-
ties are the dependent variables in the first stage. This indicates that municipalities
spend more on the earmarked categories and also spend more in total when they
receive more royalties from the extraction of oil. Thus, they largely seem to follow
the federal laws regulating the spending of royalty income. In contrast, neighboring
municipalities spend less on the non-earmarked categories when they receive more oil
royalties. A potential explanation is that the increased expenditures in earmarked
categories triggered by higher royalty income directs attention of local politicians
and thus spending away from non-earmarked categories.15
Table 1.8 in Appendix 1.8 shows the second-stage results for all single non-
earmarked categories, where each row represents a separate estimation for the indi-
cated category. We only present the most relevant coefficients and statistics in the
columns. For most of these non-earmarked categories, the F-statistic indicates that
the instrument is weak, except for the categories sport & recreation and municipal
equipment. Thus, our identification strategy allows us to identify the presence of
expenditure interactions for total expenditures and the earmarked categories as well
as for the two non-earmarked categories mentioned. For municipal equipment, we
do not find significant spatial spending interactions.16
For the category of sport and recreation, the point estimate of the significant
coefficient of spatial interaction is larger than one, indicating an explosive process.
When the five nearest neighboring municipalities increase their spending for sport
and recreation on average by 1%, this causes the focal municipality to increase its
spending in the same category by 1.25%. Given that municipalities spend a com-
15For the strength of the instrument, it is only important that it is strongly correlated with
spending of neighboring municipalities; the sign of the relationship is irrelevant.
16There appears to be weak evidence of significant fiscal interactions also in the category of
spending for justice and security, but this result must be interpreted with caution because of the
weak instrument for this category.
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Table 1.4: Main Specification: First Stage
W total W health W education W water W non-earmarked W sport & rec.
Oil extraction x oil price -0.020 0.035 -0.034 0.026 -0.045 -0.095**
(0.031) (0.042) (0.058) (0.061) (0.049) (0.041)
W Oil extraction x oil price 0.281*** 0.361*** 0.980*** 0.582*** -0.291*** -0.322***
(0.070) (0.076) (0.108) (0.119) (0.097) (0.086)
Total excl. y -0.004 0.011 -0.000 0.010** -0.014*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008)
W total excl. y 0.234*** 0.462*** 0.622*** 0.109*** 0.522***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.015) (0.019)
Population -0.121 -0.221 -0.063 1.305 -0.918 0.632
(1.279) (1.507) (1.650) (1.513) (1.908) (1.467)
Population squared 0.127 0.155 0.226 -0.596 0.458 -0.270
(0.600) (0.702) (0.770) (0.710) (0.901) (0.687)
Share of rural population -0.032 -0.066 -0.228*** -0.094 0.121 0.042
(0.058) (0.063) (0.083) (0.081) (0.075) (0.074)
Transfers 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.003** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
W population 8.399*** 3.912 11.793*** -4.401 6.386* 7.630***
(2.279) (3.008) (3.567) (3.094) (3.423) (2.935)
W population squared -3.867*** -1.835 -4.501*** 2.103 -3.287** -3.797***
(1.062) (1.404) (1.654) (1.443) (1.599) (1.363)
W share of rural population -0.691*** -0.586*** -1.685*** -0.458*** 0.070 0.178
(0.121) (0.135) (0.181) (0.147) (0.149) (0.140)
W transfers 0.036*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.039*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
R-squared 0.069 0.042 0.212 0.126 0.049 0.113
Number of municipalities 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department - year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP F-value excl. inst. 16.26 22.25 83.01 24.09 9.04 13.99
Notes: First stage IV results; the second stage is reported in Table 1.3. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008 COP.
All continuous variables in logs. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is also reported. Standard errors
given in parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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parably small share of their total budget for sport and recreation (see Figure 1.1a),
a temporarily explosive pattern during our period of analysis is not implausible.17
However, the finding of an instable spatial process should be regarded with caution
for two reasons. First, a t-test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient
is smaller than one (p-value: 0.33), so we do not rule out that the process is sta-
ble. Second, when using certain alternative spatial weighting matrices in robustness
checks reported in Section 1.6.3, the point estimate of the coefficient drops below
one. Figure 1.5 in Appendix 1.8 shows that municipal spending on sport and recre-
ation is clearly clustered both at the beginning and end of our period of analysis,
which is consistent with the presence of fiscal interactions, but it is unclear weather
these interactions are explosive during this time period.
As there is no spatial interaction in total local spending, the significant inter-
action in the spending category sport and recreation reflects a change in the com-
position of the local budget. The finding of fiscal interaction in this area reflects
the importance of sports and recreational activities all over Colombia.18 At least
three factors may explain the presence of expenditure interactions in this spend-
ing category. Firstly, because this category includes items such as playgrounds or
sports fields and instructors, these expenditures are very visible to the local vot-
ers and could therefore be used by incumbent local politicians to secure votes in
future municipal elections, as argued by Drazen and Eslava (2010). Because of its
visibility and voters’ awareness, spending in this category may be used primarily
in yardstick competition. Secondly, positive interactions could also arise because
of complementarities in expenditures in this category between neighboring munici-
palities. For example, neighboring municipalities might cooperate in certain sports
events or programs or jointly build and use sports stadiums. A third reason for
the interaction could be competition between municipalities to attract a mobile tax
base. For example, bigger and better recreational facilities might attract businesses
to the municipality that value employee wellbeing. In this case, municipalities have
17The literature on spatial competition in local public welfare spending occasionally reports
spatial interaction coefficients larger than one as well (Figlio et al., 1999; Saavedra, 2000).
18Case studies indicate that Colombian municipalities devote a high proportion of resource roy-
alties to areas like entertainment and sports complexes (Gaviria et al., 2002). We additionally run
separate estimations for different regions of Colombia and find that the statistically and econom-
ically strongest spatial interactions in spending for sport and recreation occur in the east of the
country.
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an incentive to respond to expenditures of their neighbors in this category. Each of
these explanations is consistent with the positive estimated interaction effect.
1.6.2 Classical spatial econometric approaches
For comparison with our preferred IV estimates, Table 1.5 presents the estimation
results using the traditional QML estimator with municipality and year fixed effects.
Based on this estimator that does not exploit quasi-experimental variation, the re-
sults suggest highly significant spatial autocorrelation between neighboring munici-
palities in total local public expenditures as well as all the earmarked categories and
the combined non-earmarked categories (as well as sport and recreation).19
Table 1.5: QML Results of Expenditure Interactions
Total Health Education Water Non-earmarked Sport & rec.
W y 0.182*** 0.116*** 0.148*** 0.126*** 0.147*** 0.0685***
(0.0147) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148)
Total excl. y 0.262*** 0.433*** 0.587*** 0.116*** 0.534***
(0.0350) (0.0343) (0.0367) (0.0304) (0.0263)
W total excl. y -0.000665 0.0537 -0.00902 0.0198 -0.0635
(0.0357) (0.0390) (0.0455) (0.0199) (0.0389)
Population 6.910*** 4.293 19.30*** -5.039 1.138 1.479
(2.453) (3.619) (4.936) (3.502) (3.164) (3.237)
Population squared -3.360*** -1.994 -8.497*** 2.200 -0.959 -1.001
(1.129) (1.672) (2.281) (1.642) (1.470) (1.495)
Share of rural population -0.501*** -0.313* -0.986*** 0.0308 -0.0938 0.261*
(0.147) (0.170) (0.246) (0.152) (0.159) (0.150)
Transfers 0.0283*** 0.0135*** 0.0177*** 0.0165*** 0.0271*** 0.0101***
(0.00259) (0.00330) (0.00330) (0.00361) (0.00359) (0.00299)
W population -4.206 -9.690* -8.972 7.029 1.196 4.388
(4.083) (5.759) (7.909) (6.884) (5.558) (6.673)
W population squared 2.284 4.705* 4.887 -3.101 -0.462 -2.115
(1.873) (2.664) (3.668) (3.191) (2.575) (3.099)
W share of rural population -0.00124 0.138 -0.101 0.255 0.116 0.423
(0.240) (0.267) (0.310) (0.312) (0.308) (0.280)
W transfers -0.00285 -1.20e-05 -0.0156** -0.0129** 0.00313 -0.00649
(0.00441) (0.00718) (0.00634) (0.00650) (0.00672) (0.00545)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
Number of municipalitites 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: QML estimation results of spatial expenditure interactions. The columns show results for different local public expenditure
variables Y. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008 COP. All continuous variables in logs. Standard errors
given in parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
From these estimates alone, it would be tempting to conclude that significant
spatial interaction is present in all these categories of local public expenditures.
19This also holds when we use the SAR or SEM models or different weighting matrices.
Fiscal Interactions 32
However, the results from using exogenous variation in the previous section show that
this spatial autocorrelation does not indicate causal effects. This methodological
comparison highlights the importance of relying on quasi-experimental variation in
the causal analysis of fiscal interactions.
As another comparison, Table 1.9 in Appendix 1.8 provides results from the
traditional spatial IV estimator that uses spatial lags of all control variables as ex-
cluded instruments. As argued in Section 1.5.2, we expect this estimator to be
inconsistent, like the QML estimator. The results suggest significant spatial interac-
tion in local spending on education. However, our preferred IV estimator that uses
quasi-experimental variation suggests that this correlation is spurious.20
1.6.3 Robustness checks
We assess the sensitivity of the results from our preferred IV estimator by employing
alternative weighting matrices and specifications. Table 1.6 summarizes the first
set of robustness checks for total local public expenditures (first two columns) and
local spending for sport and recreation (two rightmost columns). In the first three
table rows, we vary the number of neighbors included for constructing the k -nearest
neighbor weighting matrix. In row four, we use an inverse distance weighting matrix
where distance is defined in an economic way by the difference in income between
municipalities.21 The results show that fiscal interactions in total spending are
always insignificant.22
The point estimates also indicate strong spatial interactions in sport and recre-
ation in all specifications. Only when using the 6-NN matrix, the coefficient loses
statistical significance, suggesting that interactions cannot be detected when neigh-
bors are too far away. When using the 6-NN matrix or the inverse income distance
matrix, the point estimate of spatial interaction drops below one, which indicates a
stable process, in contrast to our baseline result of an explosive process. Thus, while
20Furthermore, when using the traditional spatial IV estimator, the point estimate of the spa-
tial interaction in total local public spending increases, but remains insignificant, and the spatial
interaction in sport and recreation loses significance.
21Geographical distance is not suitable in the Colombian context because municipalities vary
extremely in their area size, see Figure 1.2.
22This also holds when we run separate estimations for different regions within Colombia using
our baseline 5-NN weighting matrix.
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Table 1.6: Robustness Checks: Different Matrices and Specifications
Total expenditures Sport & recreation
Specification W y AP F-statistic W y AP F-statistic
4-NN weighting matrix -0.010 13.09 1.188** 17.49
(0.499) (0.539)
5-NN weighting matrix -0.081 16.26 1.257** 13.99
(0.499) (0.576)
6-NN weighting matrix -0.132 22.87 0.859 23.30
(0.496) (0.533)
Inv. income distance w. matrix 0.526 11.17 0.729* 7.976
(0.403) (0.408)
Inverse hyperbolic sine -0.121 16.94 1.284** 13.14
(0.501) (0.602)
Country-level year fixed effects -0.294 18.68 1.188*** 28.40
(0.548) (0.375)
Controlling for conflict -0.099 15.82 1.263** 13.32
(0.510) (0.594)
Notes: Each row represents a different model specification and shows the spatial autocorrelation co-
efficients for total local public spending and sport & recreation as dependent variables (separately
estimated) with the corresponding Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistics of the excluded instru-
ment to the right. Excluded IV for WY : Endowment of neighboring municipalities with oil in the 1990s
interacted with the current world market price for oil. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita
values in 2008 COP. All continuous variables in logs. Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered
on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
we find robust evidence of strong spatial interactions in local public spending for
sport and recreation, we cannot decide with high confidence whether this process is
stable or explosive.
In some spending categories, a number of municipalities report zero spending in
some years, for example in the sport and recreation category. To avoid dropping
these municipalities, in the baseline specification we add one to all spending variables
before taking the logarithm. In the robustness check in row five of Table 1.6, we use
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation instead (again using our preferred 5-NN
weighting matrix). This function is similar to the logarithm, but defined for values
of zero as well. The results are very similar to the baseline results.
To present a specification fully comparable with our QML estimation, we also
run a version of our main IV model where year fixed effects replace department-
year fixed effects. The estimates show that this alternation leaves the main results
unchanged.
Next, we assess whether the Colombian civil war that started in the 1960s influ-
ences fiscal interactions. The violence was particularly severe during the late 1990s
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and early 2000s. Civil conflicts in a certain region could induce spatially correlated
public spending patterns. Therefore, we include civil war related casualties in the
municipality and its spatial lag as additional covariates in our model. Following Dube
and Vargas (2013), we retrieve the casualties variable from the Conflict Analysis Re-
source Center (CERAC) which provides the most comprehensive and independent
source of civil war related data. However, the coefficients of these additional controls
turn out to be insignificant, and the inclusion of the variables does not affect the
estimates of the fiscal interaction coefficients. The inclusion of the variables does
not alter the findings in the QML specifications either (results not tabulated). Thus,
our results are robust to the inclusion of civil war related variables.23
Another concern regarding our model could be potential endogeneity of the total
expenditure covariate and its spatial lag. Although we exclude the category of inter-
est Y from the total expenditure controls to avoid a mechanical correlation with the
dependent variable, one may be concerned about simultaneity of choices. Therefore,
for these two potentially endogenous covariates, we consider using their one-year
time lags as excluded instruments, assuming that the error terms in Equation (2)
are serially uncorrelated. On this basis we conduct a Hausman test of endogeneity of
the two covariates.24 The test results indicate that the null hypothesis of exogeneity
of total expenditure and its spatial lag cannot be rejected. Therefore, our more
efficient baseline estimator that treats these controls as exogenous is preferred.
We also estimate more flexible specifications where we include each of the ten
other public spending categories and their spatial lags separately in the model as
control variables when a specific spending category is the dependent variable. Table
1.10 in Appendix 1.8 reports the results; we do not report the coefficients of the
spatial lags of the spending categories for brevity. The findings confirm that there
are no significant spatial interactions for the earmarked categories, and they also
replicate the size and significance of the interaction in spending for sport and recre-
ation.25 In summary, we conclude that the main results are robust to specification
23As we cannot rule out potential endogeneity of civil conflict, we do not employ this covariate
in our main specification but only in this robustness check.
24We run this test for the spending category of sport and recreation, where we found the
significant spatial interaction effect.
25However, this specification does not seem to be suitable for the health category, where the
standard error and the point estimate increase a lot. When we treat all expenditure categories
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choices as long as identification relies on our quasi-experimental instrument.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates spatial interactions in local public expenditures in a devel-
oping country applying a quasi-experimental identification strategy. We use panel
data on the universe of the more than 1000 municipalities in Colombia over a period
of eleven years to estimate spatial interaction effects in total local expenditures and
the eleven most important spending categories. For identification, we rely on exoge-
nous variation in the exposure of individual municipalities to shocks in oil prices on
the world market due to their local endowment of oil resources.
For total local public expenditures and most spending categories, the estimates of
spatial interactions are small and not significantly different from zero. The notable
exception is public expenditures for sport and recreation, where we detect significant
and large causal spatial interactions. In contrast, when we use spatial economet-
ric estimators that do not employ quasi-experimental variation, we find strong and
significant spatial autocorrelation in almost all categories of public expenditures.
Our comparison of methods shows that this spatial autocorrelation cannot be inter-
preted causally. Therefore, our results highlight the importance of using additional
exogenous sources of variation for causal inference on fiscal interactions. This is in
line with the results of Isen (2014) concerning spending competition in Ohio and
of Lyytika¨inen (2012) regarding tax competition in Finland although we do find
evidence for significant causal expenditure interactions in the spending category of
sport and recreation.
Our findings have important policy implications. The results demonstrate that
fiscal decentralization in developing countries does not necessarily lead to a general
race to the bottom concerning local public expenditures due to strategic interac-
tions of local governments. Our findings lend support to decentralization reform in
developing countries as they alleviate concerns about inefficiencies implied by fiscal
and their spatial lags as endogenous and instrument them with their on-year time lags, the point
estimate of the spatial interaction in health spending decreases to -0.08, so the large point estimate
seems to be biased.
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externalities. On the other hand, one also cannot expect that innovative expenditure
policies rolled out in a municipality, perhaps in the context of decentralized foreign
aid, will spread out substantially to neighboring municipalities through mimicking
of local expenditure policy.
A caveat is in order when applying our findings to other countries. Although
Colombian municipalities have considerable leeway in their expenditure decisions,
spending rules for royalties and transfers may restrain fiscal interactions in Colombia.
Nonetheless, many developing countries have similar institutions in this respect.
Countries such as Bolivia, Brazil and Peru directly allocate a share of income from
extractive industries to subnational governments, as Colombia does. Most countries
that levy royalties on the extraction of natural resources also impose restrictions on
how this income can be used. Thus, the case of Colombia is illustrative in a larger
context.
More research is needed to investigate whether our findings hold in other coun-
tries with and without income from natural resources, the allocation of royalties to
subnational governments and earmarking. Future research should also explore dif-
ferent quasi-experimental setups and spatial discontinuity designs, ideally within the
same institutional environment, and additional fiscal variables. Another avenue for
further research is to address the significant causal spatial interactions in local pub-
lic expenditures for sport and recreation we found and to examine the mechanisms
leading to this novel empirical result.
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1.8 Appendix
Supplementary Tables
Table 1.7: Variable Description
Variable Description
Total
Total amount of money invested in the different categories of each
municipality.
Health
Funds invested in health. Includes investment in new infrastructure,
maintenance of existing infrastructure, promotion programs, as well as
the salaries of the health centers’ employees.
Education
Funds invested in education. Includes investment in new infrastructure,
maintenance of existing infrastructure, promotion programs, as well as
the salaries of teachers.
Water
Municipal investment in aqueducts, sewage systems, garbage collection,
new sanitation infrastructure and maintenance of the existing one.
Housing
Accounts for subsidies to buy or improve houses for the poor and
expenditures to improve housing conditions of the general population.
Sport and recreation
Funds used to promote sport and leisure activities including
infrastructure, programs and instructors.
Agriculture
Payments made to improve the productivity of the agricultural sector
like infrastructure, experimental farms and consultants.
Community development
Investment in programs to support public engagement and active
citizenship.
Municipal equipment
Investment on municipal buildings, like public offices, market places,
cemeteries, public places and slaughter houses.
Vulnerable groups
Investments used for programs directed towards vulnerable groups,
including children, elderly, single mothers, displaced and disabled people.
Justice and security
Money used to pay the salaries of police officers and sheriffs, doctors,
social workers, and psychologists working for the family service agency.
Disasters prevention Investment used for disaster relief and prevention.
Source: Based on Acevedo and Bornacelly (2014).
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Table 1.8: Results for All Non-earmarked Categories
W y Total excl. y W total excl. y AP F-statistic excl. inst.
Housing -2.091 0.498*** 1.043 3.631
(1.531) (0.047) (0.711)
Agriculture -2.690 0.371*** 1.083 0.791
(4.193) (0.103) (1.732)
Com. development 1.757 0.144*** -0.324 2.824
(1.650) (0.030) (0.305)
Sport & rec. 1.257** 0.555*** -0.702** 13.99
(0.576) (0.030) (0.303)
Equipment 0.606 0.488*** -0.336 33.75
(0.392) (0.035) (0.210)
Vuln. groups -2.600 0.353*** 1.100 0.513
(4.584) (0.053) (1.818)
Justice 1.873* 0.309*** -0.496* 4.591
(1.107) (0.033) (0.285)
Dis. prevention 1.097 0.333*** -0.421 3.811
(1.101) (0.028) (0.370)
Notes: Each row represents a separate estimation for different non-earmarked spending categories. IV spec-
ification as in Table 1.3. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008 COP. All continuous
variables in logs. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is also reported.
Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01.
Table 1.9: Spatial Lags as Instruments
Health Education Water Non-earmarked Sport & rec.
W y 0.130 0.372*** 0.091 0.169 -0.100
(0.136) (0.073) (0.071) (0.124) (0.075)
Population 5.036 17.598*** -5.832** 0.828 0.902
(3.258) (4.442) (2.899) (2.988) (3.120)
Population squared -2.287 -7.621*** 2.618* -0.713 -0.684
(1.508) (2.035) (1.356) (1.384) (1.445)
Share of rural population -0.362** -1.171*** -0.021 -0.173 0.192
(0.166) (0.243) (0.155) (0.159) (0.145)
Transfers 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Total excl. y 0.265*** 0.424*** 0.592*** 0.110*** 0.531***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030) (0.026)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
Number of municipalies 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department - year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP F-statistic excl. inst. 46.46 198.4 189.2 42.95 168.3
Notes: In contrast to the main specification in Table 1.3, here, the spatial lags of all control variables are used
as excluded instruments (traditional spatial IV estimator). Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values
in 2008 COP. All continuous variables in logs. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded
instrument is also reported. Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.10: All Expenditure Categories as Separate Control Variables
Total Health Education Water Non-earmarked Sport & rec.
W y -0.081 2.114 0.304 0.282 0.550 1.391***
(0.499) (3.036) (0.246) (0.537) (0.883) (0.469)
Health 0.312*** 0.318*** 0.070***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.014)
Education 0.326*** 0.211*** 0.089***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.016)
Water 0.296*** 0.181*** 0.184***
(0.029) (0.015) (0.014)
Sport & rec. 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.190***
(0.024) (0.013) (0.014)
Housing 0.000 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.044***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Agriculture 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.109***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Community development -0.021* 0.018* 0.038*** 0.031***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Equipment 0.000 0.021*** 0.035*** 0.061***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Vulnerable groups 0.007 0.008 0.075*** 0.063***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Justice 0.036 0.025** 0.074*** 0.065***
(0.039) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Disaster prevention 0.001 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.032***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
R-squared 0.045 -0.219 0.357 0.388 -0.041 -0.034
Number of municipalities 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department - year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP F-statistic excl. inst. 16.26 1.139 82.96 13.96 5.186 19.67
Notes: In contrast to the main specification in Table 1.3, here, for each expenditure category on the left hand side, all
other spending categories and their respective spatial lags are included in the estimation as separate control variables.
The respective spatial lags of the spending categories on the right hand side are also included in the estimations but are
not displayed in the table for brevity. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008 COP. All continuous
variables in logs. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instruments is also reported. Standard
errors given in parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 1.5: Municipal expenditures per capita on sport and recreation in thousand
2008 real COP by quartiles of the pooled sample from 2000-2010.
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Data preparation and imputation
From the total number of 1122 annual municipality observations, we drop twenty
units that maintain a special territorial status different from municipalities, being
situated in very remote and sparsely populated areas. We also delete four new
municipalities established after 2007, two remote islands and three municipalities
left without direct neighbors. This leaves us with 1093 municipalities in our sample.
Missing values in expenditure variables account for less than 3% of the total
municipality-year observations. For about 90% of the municipalities with missing
values, we still observe at least nine years. Therefore, we decide against listwise
deletion of municipalities with missing values and opt for imputation by linear in-
trapolation. For covariates, this procedure is necessary in less than 0.01% of all
cases.
As a check of the data we compare the expenditure data with the Ejecuciones
Presupuestales Municipales data base provided by the Colombian National Planning
Department (DNP). While the overall consistency is very favorable, the comparison
leads us to make some minor outlier corrections. In particular, we impute linear
intrapolations for all values that are larger than twenty times a municipality’s me-
dian in the same expenditure category and correct obvious decimal point errors.
These changes affect approximatively another 3% of the observations but lead to an
improvement of the data balance. Despite these needs for correction, the resulting
dataset as described in Table 1.1 still has an exceptional quality given the developing
country setting. One qualification remains: For the years 2006 and 2007, a total of
73 municipality-year pairs exhibit zero expenditures.
Chapter 2
Intergenerational Transmission of
Social Norms: Evidence from
Argentina
2.1 Introduction
In recent decades there has been a renewed interest in the study of the determinants
of tax compliance. In most countries, compliance is high despite low penalties and
enforcement probabilities. This is partly because individuals are subject to third-
party reporting systems, and are therefore ’unable’ to evade taxes (Kleven et al.,
2011). Another part of the answer has been attributed to the intrinsic motivation to
pay taxes, or tax morale, which in turn is determined by different social and cultural
traits (Brink and Porcano, 2016; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).
These characteristics differ significantly across countries (e.g., Torgler and Schnei-
der, 2004), which implies that a part of the intrinsic motivation to comply with taxes
is passed down from one generation to another. The extent to which this happens
has received very little attention from researchers. There exist only two studies
investigating the intergenerational persistence of social norms and its direct effect
on tax compliance, and both focus on the persistence of such norms after only one
generation. Halla (2012) shows the presence of a strong correlation between the tax
morale of second-generation American-born individuals and the tax morale of their
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ancestors’ country of origin. The author uses the inherited component of tax morale
as an instrument for the actual tax morale of the individuals, and finds a positive
and significant causal effect of tax morale on the size of the shadow economy. Simi-
larly, Frimmel et al. (2018) find a causal link between non-compliance of parents and
their offspring with commuter tax allowances in Austria. Results show that children
from less compliant parents tend to be less compliant than the average.
The present study makes a significant contribution to this nascent body of liter-
ature. We investigate the intergenerational transmission of social norms related to
tax compliance in the long run in a large Argentinian city. In particular, we use de-
tailed micro data on the universe of individuals subject to property tax payments to
study the extent to which property tax compliance differs by the origin of taxpayer’s
ancestry. Access to individual records on individual property tax payments allows
us to overcome the problem of measuring tax non-compliance, which usually poses
a significant challenge in this strand of literature. Moreover, we explore long term
correlations between contemporary tax compliance levels and different measures of
unlawful behavior in the country of origin of the taxpayers’ ancestors.
Argentina provides an ideal setting to study the intergenerational transmission of
socio-economic traits. Throughout its history, the country has been the destination
of a considerable number of migration waves stemming from different countries. In
particular, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the country
experienced a dramatic increase in immigration, mainly from European countries.
Because of this distinct immigration history, present-day Argentinian population is
a mix of individuals with different ethnic origins.
The city of Santa Fe reflects this diversity of ancestry. It was the destination of a
significant proportion of migrants that arrived in Argentina during the 19th and 20th
centuries (Lattes, 1973). This, together with the possibility to study the payment
behavior of individuals with different ethnic origins within the same institutional
environment, makes our setting especially well-suited for the analysis of the long
term persistence of social traits related to tax compliance.
We use this diversity in ancestry of present-day taxpayers to study differences in
property tax compliance across individuals with different descent. For this we exploit
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a unique feature in our data that allows us to identify the most likely country of
origin of the immigrant ancestors of the taxpayers: their names. Our data contains
the full name of the individuals subject to tax compliance in the city of Santa Fe.
With the help of a software specialized in onomastics, we determine the country
of origin of the surnames in our dataset. Using additional sources, we are able
to narrow down the level of geographical disaggregation and link the surnames to
their most likely origin at the within-country level. With this information, we then
estimate differences in measures of wealth and tax payments across individuals with
different ancestry.
First we explore differences in measures of wealth by country of origin in our
data. Results point to significant differences in wealth, captured by property square
meter value, between groups of individuals with different descent. These findings are
consistent with differences in human capital (Sa´nchez-Alonso, 2019) and economic
performance (Arroyo Abad and Sa´nchez-Alonso, 2018; Pe´rez, 2019; Sa´nchez-Alonso,
2019) across groups of individuals with different nationalities that migrated to Ar-
gentina during the 19th and 20th century.
We then study how compliance differs by country of descent. We find significant
differences in timely payments between individuals with Spanish, Italian, and Bel-
gian origins. These differences are consistent across a range of robustness checks.
Italian descendants are more likely to pay their property taxes before the deadline
than individuals with Belgian and Spanish ancestry. We do not find, however, con-
sistent patterns of non-compliance across these groups of origin. Results in this
regard do not hold when correcting for potential selection bias in our data.
Our results also show that a national rather than a regional component of the
social values related to tax compliance is persistent across generations. Findings
do not change with the geographical disaggregation of the place of origin of the
surnames. When looking at variation in property tax payments across regions of
the same country of origin, we find that most regions within a country present very
similar patterns of compliance.
Finally, we investigate the presence of long-term relationships between measures
of tax compliance in our data and indicators of tax morale and unlawful behavior
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in the country of origin of the taxpayers. We do not find evidence of meaningful
correlations between the variables in the analysis. This could be explained by the
convergence of social values of the descendants of migrants over the generations
(Giavazzi et al., 2019). Another factor that can help explain this result is selection
in the migrant population. Migrants possess traits that differ substantially from that
of the individuals that stay in their country of origin. Therefore the set of values
they transmit to their descendants may differ from the set of values prevailing in
the country they left behind (Abramitzky et al., 2012; Klein, 1983; Sa´nchez-Alonso,
2019).
This study contributes to the literature mainly in two ways. Firstly, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the intergenerational transmission
of social norms related to tax compliance in the long run. As mentioned before, the
existing studies only focus on the persistence of these traits across two generations.
Secondly, we analyze transmission of social values related to tax compliance in a
developing country. Given the significant differences in many dimensions between
developed and developing countries, conclusions from our setting might differ from
analyses carried out in developed countries. Furthermore, our study shows the
potential of exploiting the information contained in the names of individuals to
answer relevant questions in economics.
Our first set of results relates to a body of literature analyzing the persistence
of cultural norms brought by migrants from their country of origin into their des-
tination country. Rice and Feldman (2006) document strong correlations between
civic values in European countries and those of American-born individuals descend-
ing from immigrants born in these countries. Giuliano (2007) finds persistence in
living arrangements of the country of emigration of the parents of second-generation
individuals living in the United States. Mocan and Pogorelova (2015) study how
the culture of leisure of the country of origin of the forebears affects individuals’ la-
bor supply. Results differ with gender, with origin of the ancestors affecting female
labor supply, but with no effects for males. More recently, Giavazzi et al. (2019)
investigate the extent of convergence of different values of immigrants settling in
the United States. The authors find that persistence differs significantly with the
number of generations, with second generations showing the highest degree of values
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persistence. The authors also argue that the speed of convergence of values with
that of the host country differs both by values and by country of origin.
In the field of economic development, Algan and Cahuc (2010) use the inherited
component of trust in US immigrants measured by survey questions to identify the
causal effect of trust on economic growth in their countries of origin over time. The
authors find that inherited trust explains a significant part of economic development.
Similarly, Tabellini (2010) finds a positive effect of cultural values like trust, respect,
and individual effort perceptions on economic development at the within country
level.
On a more general level, our study relates to the literature documenting the
persistence of socio-economic values over long periods of time using micro data.
Giuliano and Nunn (2013) find long-term persistence of democracy. Specifically,
the authors show that pre-industrial local democracy is correlated with present-day
positive beliefs of national democracy. Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2012) find persistence
over 600 years of anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany, and finds that pogroms during
the black death epidemics in the 14th century predicted violence against Jews and
votes for the Nazi party in the 20th century. Alesina et al. (2013) argues that current
gender norms are influenced by pre-industrial agricultural practices. Results from
comparisons of gender norms between children of immigrants in the United States
and Europe confirm this pattern. Guiso et al. (2016) find long-term persistence
of historical shocks on present-day social values. The authors find that cities that
transitioned to self-governance in the Middle Ages have higher contemporary civic
capital.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 explains the institutional background
of property tax in the city of Santa Fe, and the data sources used throughout the
paper. Section 2.3 analyzes differences in property tax compliance by country of
ancestry of taxpayers. Section 2.4 presents long-term correlations between measures
of unlawful behavior of the countries of origin of the surnames in our sample and
present-day property tax compliance. Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 Institutional background and data
Property taxes in Argentina are set by the sub-national governments and are admin-
istered locally. They are an important source of revenue for local governments. In
the city of Santa Fe they account for more than 30% of local revenues. The amount
of the tax is a function of the assessed property value, land area, constructed area,
and location-specific multipliers, among other attributes. At the beginning of each
year, taxpayers decide either to pay the yearly tax in monthly installments or pay
the full amount for the entire year in advance. Taxpayers choosing the first option
receive quarterly mailings from the city containing the bills for each of the three
subsequent months, which must be paid monthly.
Enforcement of property tax payments is slow and relatively lenient, mainly due
to administrative constraints. Penalties for non-compliance include economic sanc-
tions, monthly interest rates on the amount of the debt, and foreclosures. However,
they are not strictly enforced, and only high amounts of unpaid taxes receive the
attention of the authorities.
For our analysis we make use of administrative data on the universe of individu-
als subject to property tax in Santa Fe for the years 2005 to 2017. The data contains
information at the individual level about tax amounts, due dates, payment dates,
official value of the property, total area, constructed area, and the full name of the
property owner. Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for these variables. Notably,
40% of the tax bills are paid on time, the average monthly tax liability is 68 Ar-
gentinian pesos, the average property has an assessed value of 353,000 Argentinian
pesos. The typical property has an area of 1,532 square meters and a constructed
area of 118 square meters.
We use various sources to retrieve data about the ancestry of taxpayers in Santa
Fe. For the identification of the country of origin of the surnames we employed
a software provider specialized in onomastics called NamSor Applied Onomastics.
It applies AI algorithms to the full name of an individual to determine its most
likely country of origin. The software has been previously used in marketing, policy,
and academic research around the world to answer questions regarding diversity,
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Table 2.1: Descriptives
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
% paid on time 121,505 0.414 0.326
Area 118,705 1,532.483 89,461.31
Constructed Area 118,705 116.440 344.0562
Tax amount 121,505 67.969 272.665
Property value 118,705 353,039.8 3,446,330
Notes: Area and constructed area are expressed in square me-
ters. Tax amount and property value are expressed in Argen-
tinian pesos.
integration, and foreign direct investment bias, among other related topics1. Table
2.2 shows the main countries of origin for the surnames in the city of Santa Fe, with
the respective number of taxpayers assigned to each. The algorithm identified a
total of 127 countries from which the last names in our sample originate2. The five
most common countries of ancestry are Spain, Italy, France, Portugal and Germany,
and together account for the origin of 77% of the surnames in our sample, while
individuals with Spanish and Italian descent account for 67% of the total. These
numbers are well in line with the proportion of nationalities of immigrants coming
to Argentina between the 19th and 20th century (see Sa´nchez-Alonso, 2019).
The use of the software greatly facilitated the identification of the ethnic origin of
the taxpayers in our sample. In contrast, the collection of origin information at the
within-country level was a demanding task. Since regional concentration of surnames
is a good proxy for the place of origin of the ancestors of present-day individuals
(see, e.g., Cheshire, 2014; Longley et al., 2007), we used web scrappers on websites
containing information about contemporary distributions of surnames at the within-
country level3. Due to data availability, we were able to collect the most likely region
of ethnic origin for about 85% of the individuals with surnames stemming from Spain,
Italy, France and Germany; four of the countries from which most of the last names in
our sample come from. The level of geographical disaggregation available varied from
1for more information visit www.namsor.com.
2See Table 2.8 in the appendix for a complete list of the countries and the number of individuals
with ancestry from each of them.
3Specifically, we used the website of the Spanish statistics institute, www.ine.es, to retrieve
the distribution of Spanish surnames, www.paginebianche.it and www.italyheritage.com for Ital-
ian surnames, www.geopatronyme.com and www.verwandt.de for French and German surnames
respectively.
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Table 2.2: Main Countries of Origin
country of origin observations share
Spain 42,608 34.98
Italy 38,867 31.91
France 4,240 3.48
Portugal 3,886 3.19
Germany 3,810 3.13
Israel 1,856 1.52
Switzerland 1,576 1.29
Angola 1,526 1.25
Belgium 1,160 0.95
India 1,048 0.86
Other countries 21,232 17.44
Notes: the ’other countries’ category encom-
passes the remaining 117 countries in our data.
See Table 2.8 in the appendix for a complete list
of the countries.
country to country (province, region, department and land for Spain, Italy, France
and Germany respectively). In order to identify meaningful socio-economic regions
within the countries, we use the second level of the Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Statistics (NUTS-2 for its initials in French) classification determined by
the statistical office of the European Union, Eurostat, and group them according
to socio-economic relevance and the number of observations available (see Table 2.9
for a complete list of the within-country regions, the corresponding NUTS-2 entities
they encompass and the number of surnames with origins in each region).
Furthermore, we use additional sources to obtain the data necessary to analyze
long-term correlations between tax compliance in our setting and measures of unlaw-
ful social behavior in the countries of origin of the surnames. We retrieve homicide
rates from the dataset of the United Nations office for drugs and crime. The data
contains homicide counts and rates by country for the years between 2000 and 2012.
Corruption data was taken from Fisman and Miguel (2007). The study uses an in-
dex that measures subjective perceptions of corruption in different countries for the
period 1998 to 2004. The index is centered around zero, with higher values indicat-
ing higher levels of corruption. Tax morale information was taken from the World
Values Survey. This source has been extensively used in the tax morale literature
(see, e.g., Alm and Torgler, 2006; Halla, 2012; Torgler, 2006). We use this data to
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construct an average index of tax morale by country over the years 2000 to 2014.
2.3 Intergenerational transmission of tax compli-
ance
2.3.1 Ancestry and wealth measures
Before moving to the central question of this section, let us first explore potential
differences in property characteristics across groups of countries of origin of the tax-
payers’ forebears. During the decades of mass migration to Argentina in the 19th and
20th centuries, there were differences in human capital measured by literacy rates
across groups of migrants, with individuals coming from north-western European
Countries like Germany having higher literacy rates than immigrants from southern
Europe (Sa´nchez-Alonso, 2019). These differences can be transmitted down to fu-
ture generations (Borjas, 1992). There were also differences in economic performance
between groups of migrants from different nationalities once settled in Argentina.
For instance, Sa´nchez-Alonso (2019), and Arroyo Abad and Sa´nchez-Alonso (2018),
document differences in access to property and earnings between communities of
Spanish and Italian origins. Some of these differences were passed on to the next
generation (Pe´rez, 2017).
To see if there is some degree of persistence in economic performance, we explore
differences in wealth measured by property size, built-up area, property value, and
tax amount between groups of individuals with different countries of ancestry. For
this we take the average of these variables over the years 2005 to 2017 by taxpayer
and then run OLS regressions with dummies for country of descent on the right-hand
side. Table 2.3 shows regression outcomes for the five main countries of origin in
terms of the number of descendants in our sample, taking Spain as the benchmark.
Results show that there are some significant differences, especially in property size,
built area, and square meter value across countries of ancestry (Table 2.10 in the
appendix show estimation results for the 10 main countries).
From columns 1 to 4 of Table 2.3 we have that descendants from French immi-
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Table 2.3: Differences in Wealth Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables: Propery area Built area Tax amount Property value Value per m2
(m2) (m2) (Pesos) (’000 Pesos) (Pesos)
Italy 595.813 -3.473 1.543 10.921 268.068***
(701.790) (2.640) (2.291) (30.090) (51.449)
France -811.687*** -9.289*** -3.561 -30.340 117.020
(289.313) (3.473) (2.500) (19.624) (71.634)
Portugal 46.440 -7.464* -0.982 -6.243 176.255
(691.909) (4.029) (7.034) (27.330) (156.511)
Germany -622.936* -6.266 -3.742 -34.846* 653.059***
(329.783) (4.543) (2.601) (20.481) (136.426)
Other countries 663.329 -5.450* 3.373 -19.118 78.367*
(601.331) (2.812) (3.097) (15.856) (40.232)
Constant 1,234.222*** 119.592*** 85.367*** 356.400*** 2,899.670***
(284.475) (2.293) (1.769) (14.060) (25.305)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
Italy = France 0.029 0.046 0.026 0.168 0.061
Italy = Portugal 0.541 0.263 0.717 0.628 0.568
Italy = Germany 0.067 0.499 0.028 0.133 0.006
France = Portugal 0.175 0.665 0.714 0.375 0.725
France = Germany 0.281 0.521 0.945 0.824 0.000
Germany = Portugal 0.305 0.816 0.696 0.303 0.020
Observations 118,708 118,708 121,809 118,708 118,656
Notes: the benchmark category is Spain. the category ’other countries’ encompasses individuals with ancestors from the
other 122 countries in our data. Value per square meter in Column 5 was calculated by dividing the valuation of the
property by its area. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. The lower panel shows p-values for Wald tests. *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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grants have significantly smaller properties and built areas than those of Spanish
descent. The average property size belonging to French descendants is 812 square
meters smaller and has nine square meters less constructed area than properties
from individuals with Spanish ancestors. Also French descendants pay lower taxes
than taxpayers with Italian ancestors. There are also some differences in our wealth
measures for individuals with German ancestry. They have smaller and cheaper
properties than Spanish descendants, although the coefficients are slightly signifi-
cant. Their properties are also smaller and taxes are lower compared with properties
owned by and tax amounts paid by those of Italian descent.
Perhaps one of the most relevant measures of wealth in our sample is the value per
square meter. Column 5 present the results for this variable. It is interesting to see
that properties of taxpayers with German ancestry have a significant higher value per
square meter than all other ancestry groups from the table. Also Italian descendants’
properties have a higher valuation per square meter than individuals of most of
the other ethnic origins, except for German and Portuguese descendants. These
results seems to suggest that to some degree, the differences in human capital and
economic performance between groups of immigrants mentioned at the beginning
of this section were passed on over time, and are visible in our data in the form of
wealth differences measured by property square meter value.
2.3.2 Ancestry and property tax compliance
We now proceeded to analyze potential differences in the patterns of property tax
payments for different ancestry groups. As a starting point, we collapse our panel
into a cross-section. Since we are mainly interested in the effect of the origin of
the taxpayers’ forebears, and this characteristic does not change over time, we take
the average of payment dummies (see below) for all tax bills over all years for
each individual. This way we have a measure of the average payment behavior of
individuals over time. We then run the following OLS estimations:
Paymentsτi = α + βCountryi +Xγ + ei (1)
where Paymentsτi captures the proportion of payments made τ={on time, in
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advance, within 30 days, within 1 year} by taxpayer i over the period 2005-2016.
Note that for this and all subsequent analysis we drop all observations for which
we do not observe a full year of payment history after the due date of the bill4.
Countryi is the country of origin of the forebears of individual i, here we will focus
on the ten countries where most of the ancestors of tax payers originated (see Table
2.4 below). The rest are grouped in a category named ’other countries’. X is a
vector of controls including the averages of the property tax amount and property
area.
Table 2.4 summarizes the outcomes of the estimations. Results point to sta-
tistically significant differences between groups of individuals with family names
stemming from different countries. Timely compliance among Spanish descendants
is 40%. One year after the deadline, this number goes up to 60%. Taking this group
as a benchmark, individuals with an Italian surname are, on average, more punctual
with their payments: they are 1.7 percentage points more likely to pay on time, and
once the deadline has passed they are more likely to make payments within 30, 180
and 360 days by 1.9 pp.
French, German and Swiss descendants are also more punctual with their pay-
ments as compared to individuals with a Spanish surname. They pay more punc-
tually and make more payments on average within the other windows of time in
the table. With respect to the rest of the countries in our data, grouped in the
’other countries’ category, descendants of Spaniards seem to be less likely to make
payments on time, and within 30, 180 and 360 days. We also find that tax payers of
Belgian descent are less punctual on average and are less likely to make payments
within the other periods.
It is also interesting to see that the payment patterns for individuals with Por-
tuguese descent is very similar to those with Spanish ancestry. The differences
mentioned above between Spanish descendants and those of Italian, French, Ger-
man, Swiss, and Belgian descent also hold when comparing these countries with
Portugal, as indicated in the lower panel of Table 2.4. Columns 5 to 8 illustrate that
all the aforementioned effects hold after the introduction of controls. All significant
4Given that our last observation point is April 21 2017, we are not able to follow the payment
history during one year after the due date, for bills with a payment deadline after April 21 2016.
Consequently, we drop these observations from the analysis.
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Table 2.4: Property Tax Payments by Country of Descent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Payments: On time 30 days 180 days 360 days On time 30 days 180 days 360 days
Italy 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
France 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.013** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Portugal -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Germany 0.014*** 0.013** 0.015** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.013** 0.015** 0.016**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Israel 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Switzerland 0.016* 0.020** 0.018* 0.017* 0.017** 0.021** 0.020** 0.020**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Angola 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Belgium -0.091*** -0.110*** -0.117*** -0.123*** -0.091*** -0.110*** -0.117*** -0.123***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
India 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Other countries 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.407*** 0.496*** 0.550*** 0.603*** 0.406*** 0.495*** 0.549*** 0.600***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
Italy = France 0.609 0.984 0.912 0.783 0.520 0.902 0.903 0.787
Italy = Portugal 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
Italy = Germany 0.685 0.329 0.464 0.658 0.727 0.327 0.461 0.636
France = Portugal 0.030 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.057 0.016 0.007 0.004
France = Germany 0.953 0.465 0.523 0.592 0.843 0.512 0.516 0.578
Germany = Portugal 0.031 0.066 0.030 0.015 0.041 0.086 0.043 0.022
Switzerland = Portugal 0.064 0.040 0.049 0.047 0.070 0.039 0.041 0.036
Belgium = Portugal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 121,505 121,505 121,505 121,505 118,705 118,705 118,705 118,705
Notes: the table shows results from LPM estimations following the structure in Equation (1). The benchmark category is Spain. the category
’other countries’ encompasses individuals with ancestors from the other 117 countries in our data. The lower panel shows p-values for Wald
tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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coefficients remain virtually unchanged.
One potential concern is that outcomes from these cross-sectional estimations
based on average estimates over 12 years might be concealing some dynamics over
time that might affect the results. In a first step to dive into this issue, we use
the panel structure of our dataset. Table 2.11 in the appendix shows the output of
random-effects models with the same structure of equation 1 using all the years in our
sample (2005 - 2016), and dummies for payments before the deadline and within 30,
180 and 360 days. The unit of observation in this case is the tax bill. Consequently,
we cluster standard errors at the individual level. Results are very similar to the
cross-sectional ones, also after the introduction of controls. All significant effects
and point estimates are almost the same.
To further assess if results differ with the time period of analysis, we split our
sample into periods of four and two years based on the due date of the bills, and
estimate the same specifications from equation 1 within these time periods. Results
for these time windows are very similar. Tables 2.12 and 2.13 in the appendix present
the outcomes of estimations for periods of two years. Results for estimations by
periods of four years (2005 to 2008, 2009 to 2012, and 2013 to 2016) are summarized
in Table 2.5 below.5
Outcomes for Italian descendants are very similar to the ones obtained by aver-
aging all years in our data, although the coefficients are slightly smaller. Taxpayers
with Italian roots are more compliant than those with Spanish or Portuguese an-
cestors, irrespective of which time window is being considered. Similarly, effects
on payments for individuals with Belgian descent remain negative and significant
across all estimations. For individuals with French ancestry, only results for pay-
ments within 360 days appear to be robust across time periods, and the significance
of the difference in payments within 30 days is not constant when looking at narrower
time windows (see Tables 2.12 and 2.13 in the appendix). Outcomes for taxpayers
with German and Swiss descent appear to be very sensitive to the choice of the pe-
riod of analysis, which casts doubt on the reliability of estimates for these countries
of origin obtained in the previous estimations.
5Payments within 180 days were excluded from the table for the sake of brevity. However,
similar as in Table 2.4, effects on payments within 180 days are very similar to those within 360
days.
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Table 2.5: Property Tax Payments by Country of Descent in Periods of 4 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2005 - 2008 2009 - 2012 2013 - 2016
Payments: On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days
Italy 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
France 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.012* 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.011 0.013* 0.015**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Portugal 0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 0.003 0.001 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Germany 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.019*** 0.017** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Israel -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.007 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Switzerland 0.015** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.019* 0.015
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Angola 0.008 0.012 0.019** 0.003 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Belgium -0.074*** -0.098*** -0.127*** -0.129*** -0.153*** -0.166*** -0.110*** -0.128*** -0.131***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
India -0.008 -0.009 -0.003 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.016 0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Other countries 0.003 0.004* 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.007** 0.009** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.277*** 0.371*** 0.525*** 0.502*** 0.611*** 0.709*** 0.488*** 0.567*** 0.646***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
Italy = France 0.810 0.215 0.430 0.672 0.698 0.261 0.412 0.448 0.742
Italy = Portugal 0.0399 0.0374 0.00809 0.00831 0.00342 0.00204 0.0570 0.0243 0.00352
Italy = Germany 0.0357 0.0123 0.0210 0.0496 0.00614 0.0235 0.718 0.878 0.837
France = Portugal 0.0849 0.0131 0.00954 0.0897 0.0117 0.00147 0.396 0.243 0.0452
France = Germany 0.0779 0.00512 0.0196 0.233 0.0174 0.0110 0.384 0.663 0.692
Germany = Portugal 0.961 0.758 0.804 0.629 0.891 0.526 0.0937 0.117 0.0192
Observations 100,467 100,467 100,467 106,816 106,816 106,816 118,676 118,676 118,676
Notes: the table shows results from LPM estimations following the structure in Equation (1) within periods of 4 years.All specifications contain controls for tax
amount and property area. The benchmark category is Spain. the category ’other countries’ encompasses individuals with ancestors from the other 117 countries
in our data. The lower panel shows p-values for Wald tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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So far we have found a consistent pattern of differences in property tax pay-
ments made within a period of time between some countries of origin. We have
not yet attempted to study differences in a more direct measure of non-compliance.
Therefore, in a next step we consider a different set of indicators for property tax
compliance. First we split our sample into periods of three years. Within this time
lapse we calculate the share of monthly bills payed before and after the deadline,
and the share of bills for which no payment is observed at any point in time for each
individual. We then estimate equation 1 with these variables on the left-hand side.
Results present a similar pattern as the estimations from above. Table 2.6 illus-
trates the outcomes for relevant countries. In all columns taxpayers with an Italian
surname have a higher probability of paying before the deadline and consequently
make fewer late payments as compared to individuals of Spanish descent in all the
periods. However, the differences with respect to individuals with Portuguese ances-
tors are not consistent across estimations. Belgian origin is significantly correlated
with a higher proportion of late payments and a smaller share of early payments
with respect to Spanish descent in all specifications. Results for other countries of
origin are not consistent across specifications.
Given that we do not observe the actual payment behavior of individuals who
did not pay the tax bill before the last point of observation in our data, results for
our measure of non-compliance based on late payments in Columns 2, 6, 10 and 14
of Table 2.6 might be biased. To correct for this, we estimated a two-stage Heckman
model (Heckman, 1979) for the same 3-three year periods with the share of bills paid
after the deadline as the dependent variable in the main equation. We use both total
and constructed area, tax amount, and official value of the property as independent
variables in the selection equation. Results from Table 2.6 suggest that truncation
bias is indeed relevant for these estimations (the null hypothesis of no selection is
rejected in all specifications: see the lower panels in Table 2.6), and consequently the
statistical significance of the coefficients for the Italian and Belgian surnames does
not hold in all the specifications, which casts doubts on the validity of our previous
results of differences in non-compliance based on the share of bills paid after the
deadline.
From the set of results we have so far, we can draw some general conclusions.
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Table 2.6: Property Tax Payments by Country of Descent for Periods of 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2005 - 2007 2008 - 2010
Share of payments: Early Late Never Late Early Late Never Late
(heckman) (heckman)
Italy 0.006*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009*** 0.010*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.009**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Belgium -0.058*** 0.055*** 0.156*** 0.020*** -0.117*** 0.113*** 0.150*** 0.040**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020)
Constant 0.212*** 0.753*** 0.161*** 0.673*** 0.442*** 0.497*** 0.152*** 0.293***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.013)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
Italy = Portugal 0.132 0.018 0.005 0.883 0.004 0.158 0.000 0.514
Selection 0.000 0.000
Observations 98,775 98,775 98,775 98,775 103,993 103,993 103,993 103,994
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
2011 - 2013 2014 - 2016
Share of payments: Early Late Never Late Early Late Never Late
(heckman) (heckman)
Italy 0.014*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.008 0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Belgium -0.130*** 0.141*** 0.168*** 0.047** -0.085*** 0.106*** 0.122*** 0.025
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.026)
Constant 0.527*** 0.452*** 0.202*** 0.149*** 0.375*** 0.344*** 0.202*** -0.120***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.038)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
Italy = Portugal 0.027 0.126 0.000 0.842 0.184 0.061 0.006 0.696
Selection 0.000 0.000
Observations 108,444 108,444 108,444 108,445 118,492 118,492 118,492 118,493
Notes: The table summarizes results from OLS estimations with the share of monthly payments within 36 months made early, late or never made on
the left hand side. Columns 4, 8, 12 and 16 present outcomes from Heckman two-stage estimations of the share of late payments within 36 months
as dependent variable. Heckman estimations use constructed area, tax amount and property value as independent variables in the selection equation.
For these same columns, the table also shows the p-value of the null hypothesis of no selection bias. All specifications include controls for tax amount
and property area. The benchmark category is Spain, estimates for France, Portugal, Germany, Israel, Switzerland, Angola, India, and a category
encompassing individuals with ancestors from the other 117 countries in our data, are omitted from the table. The lower panel shows p-values for
Wald tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Transmission of Social Norms 59
There are consistent patterns in differences in payment behavior between groups
of taxpayers with a common descent. These results are robust to changes in the
period of analysis, the introduction of controls and changes in the specifications.
Individuals with Italian ancestors are more likely to pay the monthly property tax
bills on time than taxpayers with Spanish ancestry. In turn, the latter are on average
more compliant with their payments than individuals with Belgian roots. However,
the extent to which non-compliance, understood as the proportion of bills paid after
the deadline, differs across these countries of origin is unclear. The differences are
not significant when correcting for the potential bias caused by the presence of
truncation in our sample. As for differences in tax payments for the other countries
of origin we analyzed, the estimates are not robust to changes in the parameters of
the specifications, therefore cannot be regarded as valid.
2.3.3 Differences in tax compliance within countries of ori-
gin
Results from the previous section point to differences in timely compliance with prop-
erty tax payments when grouping taxpayers according to the country from which
their ancestors originated. However, countries generally encompass diverse regions
that can be very different from each other in many regards. Traits like languages, in-
stitutions, social norms, and levels of economic performance differ drastically across
regions in many countries around the world. More relevant to our setting, there
is also some evidence of differences in tax morale at the within-country level (see,
e.g., Torgler and Schneider, 2004). For example, it is a well-known fact that there
exist strong differences in the economic performance between northern and south-
ern latitudes in countries like Italy or Spain. Therefore analyzing differences in the
compliance of individuals according to the origin of their ancestors at the country
level, might conceal potentially relevant regional differences in social norms related
to property tax compliance.
To uncover potential differences in property tax payments of individuals accord-
ing to their ancestry at the within-country level of disaggregation, we perform a
range of estimations similar to the ones analyzed in the previous section. This time,
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however, we include a set of dummies for the region inside the country from which
the taxpayers’ ancestors came from. As mentioned in section 2.2, we were able to
identify the region of descent of 85% of taxpayers with ancestors from Spain, Italy,
and Germany. Therefore, for these countries of origin, we limit the analysis to said
observations.
The regions were formed according to the number of observations assigned to
each of the NUTS-1 units in each country. For Spain, we divided observations
between north and south. In the case of Italy, the division was made between
north, center and south. French origins were assigned to Paris basin, east, north,
and the rest of the country. Germany was divided into North Rhine-Westphalia,
Baden-Wu¨rttenberg, Berlin, Bavaria and the rest of the states. See Table 2.9 in the
appendix for detailed information about the composition of the regional divisions
used here and the number of observations assigned to each.
We then proceed to estimate all the specifications from the last section with
dummies for the aforementioned regions, keeping dummies for the remaining coun-
tries we analyzed in the last section on the right hand side. Table 2.7 presents the
results for cross-sectional estimations analogous to equation 1, with payments made
on time and within 30, 180, and 360 days on the left-hand side (Outcomes for the
additional estimations are available in Tables 2.14 to 2.18 in the appendix).
In general, findings are very similar to those from the previous section. Taking
descendants from southern Spaniards as a benchmark, individuals with ancestors
from all Italian regions are more likely to pay the bills for property tax on time. They
are also more likely to make payments within 30, 180, and 360 days. There are no
significant differences in payment patterns between Italian regions. These findings
are consistent across all specifications. Regarding the other countries, taxpayers with
ancestry from the Paris basin of France are more likely to make payments within 360
days, and in some regressions there is some indication that having origins from the
north of the country is correlated with a higher likelihood of making payments within
180 and 360 days, however results are not robust to changes in the specifications.
There are no consistent payment differences for individuals with ancestors from
the regions in Germany. Results from estimations of non-compliance based on the
share of monthly tax bills paid late within three years are also not significant when
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correcting for truncation bias.
Table 2.7: Property Tax Payments by Regions of Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Payments On time 30 days 180 days 360 days On time 30 days 180 days 360 days
Northern Spain 0.004 0.006* 0.007* 0.007* 0.005 0.007* 0.008** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Northern Italy 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Italy 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Southern Italy 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
France Paris basin 0.019* 0.023** 0.025** 0.028*** 0.019* 0.022** 0.025** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Eastern France 0.007 0.017 0.021* 0.020* 0.009 0.019* 0.023** 0.023**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Northern France 0.025** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.023** 0.030** 0.029** 0.029**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Rest of France 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
North Rhine-Westphalia -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 -0.003 -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 -0.005
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Baden-Wu¨rttenberg 0.012 0.017 0.022 0.023 0.016 0.020 0.025 0.025
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Berlin 0.019 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.026
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Bavaria -0.021 -0.028 -0.031 -0.030 -0.024 -0.032 -0.034 -0.033
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Rest of Germany 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.042***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Belgium -0.089*** -0.106*** -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.089*** -0.106*** -0.113*** -0.119***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Constant 0.405*** 0.492*** 0.546*** 0.599*** 0.404*** 0.491*** 0.545*** 0.595***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Controls - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 114,969 114,969 114,969 114,969 112,315 112,315 112,315 112,315
Notes: the table shows results from LPM estimations following the structure in Equation (1). The benchmark category is southern Spain.
Portugal, Israel, Switzerland, Angola, India and a category including the other 117 countries in our data are excluded from the table. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Contrary to what one would expect given the existing contrasts between regions
inside a country, we do not find evidence of differences in payment patterns between
taxpayers with descent from different regions of a country. This suggests that, de-
spite regional differences in many regards, the inherited part of social values related
to tax compliance is shared by the average descendant of the individuals of a coun-
try. In our setting, the differences in this inherited trait translate into differences on
timely payments between individuals with Spanish and Italian descent.
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2.4 Long-term persistence of social norms
The existing literature on intergenerational transmission of social values, and its
direct effect on tax compliance documents the persistence of such traits over the
course of one generation (Frimmel et al., 2018; Halla, 2012). In this section we study
the persistence of social traits related to tax compliance and economic outcomes from
the country of origin of the ancestors of tax payers in the city of Santa Fe.
Tax morale is an important determinant of tax compliance (Halla, 2012), and
according to Luttmer and Singhal (2014), it encompasses various cultural character-
istics, like the level of corruption in a country (DeBacker et al., 2015), or the size of
the shadow economy (Halla, 2012; Schneider, 2005). Following these ideas, we turn
to investigate the existence of potential correlations between current measures of
crime, corruption, and tax morale in countries of descent and indicators of property
tax compliance for individuals with ancestors stemming from those countries.
For this exercise we use the average of individual share of payments made on time,
late, and never made by country of origin as measures of property tax compliance.
Indicators of corruption in countries of origin were taken from the corruption index
in Fisman and Miguel (2007). It assigns each country a score based in subjective
perceptions of corruption. The index is centered around zero, with higher values
indicating more corruption. Measures for tax morale come from the World Values
Survey, as is standard in the literature. Finally, as an indicator of crime we use
homicide rates by country from the United Nations office for drugs and crime.
Figure 2.1 shows scatter plots illustrating the correlation between the share of
property tax payments made on time during the whole period of analysis and indi-
cators for tax morale, corruption and crime for some of the ten countries of origin we
used for the analysis in the previous section6. Similar figures showing correlations
for other measures of property tax compliance can be found in Graphs 2.2 and 2.3
in the appendix.
We do not find evidence of significant correlations between property tax com-
pliance in the city of Santa Fe and tax morale or measures of unlawful behavior
in the countries of origin. There is also no significant relationship between these
6The number of countries in each panel of the the graph was dictated by data availability
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Figure 2.1: Property tax compliance correlations
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Notes: The top-left panel uses tax morale indicators from the World Values Survey averaged over
the period 2000-2014. The top-right panel uses homicide rates per 100.000 inhabitants from the
United Nations office for drugs and crime over the period 2000-2012. The lower-left panel uses
the corruption index from Fisman and Miguel (2007). The variable on the x axis in all panels is
the share of early payments made during the whole period of analysis.
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variables when all countries of origin in our data are included7. Results are similarly
inconclusive for the other measures of tax compliance.
The absence of correlation between tax compliance measures and tax morale in
the country of origin might suggest that social values related to tax compliance could
have evolved differently in the country of origin and in Argentina since the time of
migration. These values developed over time in both countries in such a way that
present-day outcomes are no longer correlated. One reason for this is that individuals
that emigrated to Argentina during the 19th and 20th centuries were systematically
different from their countrymen that chose to stay behind (Abramitzky et al., 2012;
Klein, 1983; Sa´nchez-Alonso, 2019), and therefore might have transmitted different
social values to their respective descendants. Another factor that might help to
explain to some extent is the convergence of social values over time Giavazzi et al.
(2019). Present-day taxpayers might be the third or fourth generation that has
been living in Argentina, so their set of social values might have converged to those
existing in the country to such an extent that they are no longer related to the social
values of their ancestors.
2.5 Concluding remarks
We analyzed the intergenerational transmission of social values related to tax compli-
ance. Exploiting the genealogical information contained in the surnames of present-
day taxpayers, we identified the country of origin of their ancestors. This infor-
mation, together with administrative records of property tax payments, allowed us
to study differences in compliance by taxpayers’ country of descent. Results from
a broad range of specifications document the presence of intergenerational trans-
mission of social norms related to tax compliance. We find significant differences
in compliance for some groups of ancestry in our data. Taxpayers with a common
country of descent share similar social values related to tax compliance, despite their
ancestors originating from considerably different regions within the same country.
Consistent with convergence of social values over time and self-selection of migrants,
we do not find evidence of significant correlations between property tax compliance
7These set of results are available from the author upon request.
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in our setting and contemporary indicators of tax morale and unlawful behavior in
the taxpayers ancestors’ country of origin. Our data did not allow us to analyze the
degree of convergence of social values over time or address the issue of self-selection
of migrants. This seems like a promising avenue for future research.
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2.6 Appendix
Table 2.8: List of Countries and Number of Individuals
Country name N Country name N Country name N Country name N
Spain 42,541 Russian Federation 285 Morocco 118 Togo 44
Italy 38,721 Armenia 285 Uganda 115 Qatar 43
France 4,234 Tunisia 281 Serbia 115 Yemen, Rep. 40
Portugal 3,869 Cote D’Ivoire 276 Egypt, Arab Rep. 113 Myanmar 35
Germany 3,801 Tanzania 272 Bulgaria 107 North Korea 34
Israel 1,851 Ukraine 269 Bahrain 104 Gambia, The 34
Switzerland 1,576 Madagascar 261 Botswana 102 Montenegro 33
Angola 1,523 Niger 260 Norway 101 Cameroon 32
Belgium 1,158 Iraq 242 China 101 Jordan 28
India 1,046 Vietnam 237 Mozambique 97 Gabon 25
Netherlands 837 Mali 236 Taiwan, China 96 Estonia 24
Austria 748 West Bank And Gaza 230 Croatia 94 Kyrgyz Republic 24
United Kingdom 740 Rwanda 228 Lithuania 94 Malawi 22
Poland 707 Ghana 225 Comoros 93 Afghanistan 17
Sri Lanka 543 Cyprus 223 Korea, Rep. 83 Libya 16
Iceland 537 Japan 219 Hungary 74 Bosnia And Herzegovina 15
Mongolia 492 Senegal 218 Mauritius 74 Hong Kong, China 12
Indonesia 478 Kazakhstan 204 Syrian Arab Republic 73 Eritrea 10
Romania 460 Burundi 201 Mauritania 72 Uzbekistan 7
Turkey 441 Nigeria 200 Zambia 71 Oman 5
Ireland 430 Finland 199 Zimbabwe 67 Kuwait 5
Moldova 424 Bangladesh 197 Macedonia, Fyr 66 Central African Republic 4
Denmark 420 Georgia 176 Nepal 64 United Arab Emirates 2
Pakistan 400 Benin 162 Chad 61 Turkmenistan 1
Lebanon 397 Sweden 162 Somalia 53 Tajikistan 1
Guinea 370 Greece 155 Slovak Republic 52
Ethiopia 368 Liberia 144 Thailand 51
South Africa 358 Kenya 131 Azerbaijan 51
Namibia 357 Iran, Islamic Rep. 131 Congo, Rep. 50
Algeria 336 Congo, Dem. Rep. 131 Sudan 50
Lesotho 332 Malaysia 130 Brunei Darussalam 47
Czech Republic 331 Latvia 126 Cambodia 45
Belarus 291 Slovenia 126 Lao Pdr 45
Burkina Faso 289 Albania 121 Saudi Arabia 44
Notes: The table shows the complete list of countries of origin of the ancestors of present-day taxpayers in the city of Santa Fe. The table
also shows the number of individuals with ancestry from each country.
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Table 2.9: List of Regions Within Countries
Country Region of analysis N NUTS - 2 Country Region of analysis N NUTS - 2
Spain North 25,996 Madrid France Paris basin 1,208 Iˆle-de-France
Galicia Champagne-Ardenne
Basque Country Picardy
Asturias Upper Normandy
Balear Ilands Centre
Castilla and Leon Lower Normandy
Cataluna Burgundy
Navarra East 1,169 Lorraine
Aragon Alsace
Cantabria Franche-Comte´
Rioja North 983 Nord-Pas-de-Calais
South 13,436 Andalucia Rest 564 Pays de la Loire
Canarias Brittany
Valencia Poitou-Charentes
Murcia Aquitaine
Extremadura Midi-Pyre´ne´es
Castilla-La Mancha Limousin
Melilla Rhoˆne-Alpes
Ceuta Auvergne
Italy North 22,211 Lombardy Languedoc-Roussillon
Piedmont Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur
Veneto Corsica
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia Germany Berlin 521 Berlin
Emilia-Romagna Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 321 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
Liguria North Rhine-Westphalia 302 North Rhine-Westphalia
Trentino-South Tyrol Bavaria 283 Bavaria
Aosta Valley Rest 962 Lower Saxony
Center 5,777 Lazio Hesse
Tuscany Rhineland-Palatinate
Marche Hamburg
Umbria Schleswig-Holstein
South 9,028 Siciliy Saxony
Campania Saarland
Apulia Bremen
Sardinia Brandenburg
Calabria Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Abruzzo Thuringia
Basilicata Saxony-Anhalt
Molise
Notes: The table shows the groups of NUTS-2 entities that were used in the analysis in section 2.3.3 to produce Table 2.9. The table shows the number of surnames
that originated from a specific region within a country. The regions into which NUTS-2 entities are grouped were selected according to socio-economic relevance and
number of observations.
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Table 2.10: Differences in Wealth Measures (10 Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables: Property area Built area (sq. Mts.) Tax amount Property value Value per m
(m) (m) (Pesos) (’000s Pesos) (Pesos)
Italy 595.813 -3.473 1.543 10.921 268.068***
(701.805) (2.640) (2.291) (30.091) (51.450)
France -811.687*** -9.289*** -3.561 -30.340 117.020
(289.319) (3.473) (2.500) (19.625) (71.636)
Portugal 46.440 -7.464* -0.982 -6.243 176.255
(691.924) (4.029) (7.034) (27.331) (156.514)
Germany -622.936* -6.266 -3.742 -34.846* 653.059***
(329.790) (4.543) (2.601) (20.482) (136.429)
Israel 4,030.886 -2.700 20.000 -25.065 306.039**
(4,865.782) (5.936) (22.689) (22.599) (149.449)
Switzerland 1,584.926 -2.287 -1.046 39.620 -0.521
(1,705.888) (7.801) (4.259) (49.892) (108.126)
Angola -789.133*** -2.386 -4.230 10.904 -97.240
(295.175) (6.825) (3.056) (36.913) (166.683)
Belgium -743.421** -31.716*** -14.098*** -119.583*** -891.806***
(307.308) (5.177) (5.358) (19.864) (101.396)
India -919.168*** 0.921 6.028 -29.763 64.405
(289.188) (12.436) (11.000) (34.722) (137.009)
Other countries 559.653 -5.019* 3.618 -19.097 130.819***
(622.292) (2.970) (3.210) (16.420) (44.142)
Constant 1,234.222*** 119.592*** 85.367*** 356.400*** 2,899.670***
(284.481) (2.293) (1.769) (14.061) (25.306)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
Italy = France 0.029 0.046 0.026 0.168 0.061
Italy = Portugal 0.541 0.263 0.717 0.628 0.568
Italy = Germany 0.066 0.499 0.028 0.133 0.006
France = Portugal 0.175 0.665 0.714 0.375 0.725
France = Germany 0.281 0.521 0.945 0.824 0.000
Germany = Portugal 0.305 0.816 0.696 0.303 0.020
Observations 118,708 118,708 121,809 118,708 118,656
Notes: the table shows the outcomes of OLS estimations. The benchmark category is Spain. the category ’other countries’ encompasses
individuals with ancestors from the other 117 countries in our data. Value per square meter in Column 5 was calculated by dividing
the valuation of the property by its area. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. The lower panel shows p-values for Wald
tests. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11: Property Tax Payments by Country of Descent - Panel Estimations
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (8)
Payments: On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days
Italy 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
France 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.013** 0.018*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Portugal -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Germany 0.013** 0.012* 0.015** 0.014** 0.012* 0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Israel 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Switzerland 0.016* 0.019** 0.017* 0.017** 0.020** 0.019**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Angola 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Belgium -0.096*** -0.115*** -0.127*** -0.095*** -0.114*** -0.127***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
India 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Other countries 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.415*** 0.504*** 0.610*** 0.413*** 0.502*** 0.608***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
Italy = France 0.653 0.958 0.729 0.545 0.938 0.761
Italy = Portugal 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000
Italy = Germany 0.558 0.248 0.550 0.608 0.253 0.537
France = Portugal 0.026 0.007 0.002 0.057 0.015 0.003
France = Germany 0.901 0.357 0.479 0.962 0.416 0.490
Germany = Portugal 0.043 0.084 0.018 0.058 0.113 0.028
Controls - - - Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,948,139 13,948,139 13,948,139 13,820,129 13,820,129 13,820,129
Number of clusters 121,505 121,505 121,505 118,705 118,705 118,705
Notes: The table shows the results of random effects panel estimations. The benchmark category is Spain. the category
’other countries’ encompasses individuals with ancestors from the other 117 countries in our data. The lower panel shows
p-values for Wald tests. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.12: Property Tax Payments by Country of Descent in Periods of 2 Years
(2005 - 2010)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2005 - 2006 2007 - 2008 2009 - 2010
Payments: On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days
Italy 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
France 0.004* 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.015** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.009 0.018** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Portugal -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Germany 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Israel 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Switzerland 0.008** 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.019* 0.025** 0.023** 0.011 0.019* 0.023**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Angola 0.003 0.007* 0.017*** 0.008 0.010 0.014 -0.001 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Belgium -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.085*** -0.115*** -0.156*** -0.168*** -0.125*** -0.153*** -0.162***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
India -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.014 -0.017 -0.007 0.006 0.005 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Other countries 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.123*** 0.152*** 0.355*** 0.435*** 0.592*** 0.697*** 0.482*** 0.617*** 0.720***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
Italy = France 0.865 0.347 0.771 0.740 0.237 0.299 0.441 0.963 0.441
Italy = Portugal 0.021 0.046 0.004 0.152 0.105 0.068 0.005 0.003 0.007
Italy = Germany 0.210 0.165 0.146 0.112 0.049 0.059 0.013 0.002 0.006
France = Portugal 0.108 0.030 0.017 0.185 0.036 0.032 0.111 0.019 0.009
France = Germany 0.411 0.084 0.189 0.147 0.019 0.028 0.176 0.016 0.008
Germany = Portugal 0.443 0.674 0.292 0.892 0.792 0.952 0.820 0.941 0.968
Observations 97,193 97,193 97,193 100,065 100,065 100,065 102,039 102,039 102,039
Notes: the table shows results from LPM estimations following the structure in Equation (1) within periods of 2 years. All specifications contain controls for tax
amount and property area. The benchmark category is Spain. the category ’other countries’ encompasses individuals with ancestors from the other 117 countries
in our data. The lower panel shows p-values for Wald tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.13: Property Tax Payments by Country of Descent in Periods of 2 Years
(2011 - 2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2011 - 2012 2013 - 2014 2015 - 2016
Payments: On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days
Italy 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
France 0.014** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.010 0.012* 0.015** 0.009 0.011 0.014*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Portugal 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 0.007 0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Germany 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.014* 0.011 0.011 0.016** 0.014* 0.018**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Israel -0.004 0.001 0.006 -0.008 0.004 0.012 -0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Switzerland 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.014
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Angola 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.007 0.004 0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Belgium -0.134*** -0.155*** -0.170*** -0.134*** -0.154*** -0.166*** -0.109*** -0.128*** -0.128***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
India 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.021 0.016
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Other countries 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.008** 0.010** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.532*** 0.621*** 0.718*** 0.537*** 0.620*** 0.707*** 0.479*** 0.562*** 0.637***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
Italy = France 0.781 0.799 0.359 0.609 0.687 0.920 0.403 0.391 0.596
Italy = Portugal 0.037 0.011 0.001 0.317 0.124 0.009 0.018 0.014 0.005
Italy = Germany 0.178 0.036 0.102 0.947 0.585 0.670 0.952 0.618 0.933
France = Portugal 0.167 0.034 0.002 0.699 0.379 0.036 0.235 0.208 0.079
France = Germany 0.409 0.075 0.056 0.748 0.904 0.692 0.513 0.804 0.652
Germany = Portugal 0.593 0.742 0.241 0.490 0.458 0.097 0.072 0.140 0.031
Observations 106,541 106,541 106,541 109,954 109,954 109,954 118,202 118,202 118,202
Notes: the table shows results from LPM estimations following the structure in Equation (1) within periods of 2 years. All specifications contain controls for tax
amount and property area. The benchmark category is Spain. the category ’other countries’ encompasses individuals with ancestors from the other 117 countries
in our data. The lower panel shows p-values for Wald tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Transmission of Social Norms 72
Table 2.14: Property Tax Payments by Region of Descent - Panel Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payments: On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days
Northern Spain 0.004 0.007* 0.007* 0.005 0.007* 0.008**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Northern Italy 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Italy 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Southern Italy 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
France Paris basin 0.019** 0.023** 0.029*** 0.018* 0.022** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Eastern France 0.007 0.017 0.020* 0.008 0.019* 0.023**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Northern France 0.025** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.023** 0.030** 0.029**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Rest of France 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
North Rhine-Westphalia -0.005 -0.009 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
Baden-Wu¨rttenberg 0.013 0.018 0.024 0.016 0.021 0.026
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
Berlin 0.017 0.018 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.024
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Bavaria -0.021 -0.028 -0.030 -0.024 -0.032 -0.033
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
Rest of Germany 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.041***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Belgium -0.093*** -0.111*** -0.123*** -0.093*** -0.110*** -0.123***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Constant 0.412*** 0.500*** 0.606*** 0.411*** 0.499*** 0.604***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls - - - Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,179,731 13,179,731 13,179,731 13,058,200 13,058,200 13,058,200
Number of clusters 114,969 114,969 114,969 112,315 112,315 112,315
Notes: The table shows the results of random effects panel estimations. The benchmark category is northern Spain.
The table displays coefficients of dummies for region of origin of the individuals’ ancestors within Spain, Italy, France and
Germany (See Table 2.9 for information about the geographical entities grouped under each region). Observations for these
countries were limited to those that were assigned a region within the respective country, otherwise they were excluded
from the analysis. Estimates for Portugal, Israel, Switzerland, Angola, India and a category grouping the remaining 117
countries in our data are omitted from the table. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.15: Property Tax Payments by Region of Descent for Periods of 4 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2005 - 2008 2009 - 2012 2013 - 2016
Payments: On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days
Northern Spain 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.008*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Northern Italy 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Central Italy 0.010** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.015** 0.018*** 0.017**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Southern Italy 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
France Paris basin 0.014* 0.019** 0.024** 0.022* 0.026** 0.033*** 0.015 0.020 0.031**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Eastern France 0.011 0.025*** 0.025** 0.013 0.027** 0.028** -0.003 0.003 0.009
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Northern France 0.007 0.020** 0.025** 0.021 0.032** 0.033** 0.025* 0.024* 0.023
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Rest of France 0.009 0.018 0.014 -0.005 0.005 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.011
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 0.016 0.015 0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.002
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Baden-Wu¨rttenberg 0.012 0.011 0.010 -0.012 -0.004 0.019 0.015 0.032 0.036
(0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Berlin 0.007 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.004 -0.004 0.025 0.026 0.034*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Bavaria -0.009 -0.016 -0.008 -0.024 -0.028 -0.029 -0.027 -0.040 -0.041
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Rest of Germany 0.003 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.015 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.042***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Belgium -0.074*** -0.096*** -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.149*** -0.162*** -0.107*** -0.124*** -0.127***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.277*** 0.370*** 0.523*** 0.499*** 0.608*** 0.706*** 0.486*** 0.564*** 0.641***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 95,139 95,139 95,139 101,259 101,259 101,259 112,592 112,592 112,592
Notes: the table shows results from LPM estimations following the structure in Equation (1) with dummies for the regions of origin of the individuals’ ancestors
within Spain, Italy, France and Germany within periods of 4 years (See Table 2.9 for information about the geographical entities grouped under each region).
Observations for these countries were limited to those that were assigned a region within the respective country, otherwise they were excluded from the analysis.
Estimates for Portugal, Israel, Switzerland, Angola, India and a category grouping the remaining 117 countries in our data are omitted from the table. All
specifications contain controls for tax amount and property area. The benchmark category is southern Spain. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.16: Property Tax Payments by Region of Descent for Periods of 2 Years
(2005 - 2010)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2005 - 2006 2007 - 2008 2009 - 2010
Payments: On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days
Northern Spain 0.001 0.002* 0.003 -0.000 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Northern Italy 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Central Italy 0.005** 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.012* 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Southern Italy 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
France Paris basin 0.008** 0.009** 0.016** 0.021* 0.029** 0.032** 0.024* 0.031** 0.032**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Eastern France 0.002 0.010** 0.015* 0.014 0.032** 0.028** 0.003 0.018 0.017
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Northern France 0.005 0.010** 0.018** 0.009 0.028* 0.031** 0.003 0.018 0.030**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Rest of France 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.012 0.008 0.001 0.009 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
North Rhine-Westphalia -0.000 -0.002 0.007 0.007 0.002 -0.003 0.019 0.020 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Baden-Wu¨rttenberg -0.001 0.003 0.010 0.035 0.027 0.020 -0.028 -0.006 0.016
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Berlin 0.011* 0.014** 0.015 0.005 0.016 0.016 0.005 0.007 -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
Bavaria 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.017 -0.025 -0.017 -0.021 -0.028 -0.028
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027)
Rest of Germany 0.001 0.006 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.014 -0.009 -0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Belgium -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.083*** -0.115*** -0.153*** -0.165*** -0.124*** -0.151*** -0.160***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant 0.123*** 0.151*** 0.353*** 0.435*** 0.590*** 0.694*** 0.482*** 0.615*** 0.719***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 91,965 91,965 91,965 94,759 94,759 94,759 96,695 96,695 96,695
Notes: the table shows results from LPM estimations following the structure in Equation (1) with dummies for the regions of origin of the individuals’ ancestors
within Spain, Italy, France and Germany within periods of 2 years (See Table 2.9 for information about the geographical entities grouped under each region).
Observations for these countries were limited to those that were assigned a region within the respective country, otherwise they were excluded from the analysis.
Estimates for Portugal, Israel, Switzerland, Angola, India and a category grouping the remaining 117 countries in our data are omitted from the table. All
specifications contain controls for tax amount and property area. The benchmark category is southern Spain. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.17: Property Tax Payments by Region of Descent for Periods of 2 Years
(2011 - 2016)
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
2011 - 2012 2013 - 2014 2015 - 2016
Payments: On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days On time 30 days 360 days
Northern Spain 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.009* 0.005 0.008 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Northern Italy 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Central Italy 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.015** 0.020*** 0.019***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Southern Italy 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
France Paris basin 0.019 0.020 0.030** 0.015 0.019 0.032** 0.011 0.016 0.025*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Eastern France 0.018 0.028** 0.030** 0.000 0.005 0.007 -0.008 0.000 0.010
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Northern France 0.031** 0.039*** 0.035** 0.029** 0.028* 0.029** 0.025* 0.026* 0.019
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Rest of France -0.013 -0.005 0.011 0.011 0.015 0.010 0.019 0.018 0.014
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.015 0.015 0.027 0.010 0.011 0.027 -0.032 -0.031 -0.013
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
Baden-Wu¨rttenberg -0.006 -0.008 0.014 0.011 0.027 0.034 0.019 0.039 0.047*
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Berlin 0.013 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.012 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.031
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Bavaria -0.017 -0.021 -0.023 -0.011 -0.025 -0.036 -0.047* -0.060** -0.048*
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Rest of Germany 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.031** 0.032** 0.033** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.042***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Belgium -0.132*** -0.152*** -0.166*** -0.131*** -0.150*** -0.161*** -0.107*** -0.124*** -0.122***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.529*** 0.618*** 0.713*** 0.534*** 0.616*** 0.701*** 0.477*** 0.558*** 0.632***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 100,991 100,991 100,991 104,296 104,296 104,296 112,142 112,142 112,142
Notes: the table shows results from LPM estimations following the structure in Equation (1) with dummies for the regions of origin of the individuals’ ancestors
within Spain, Italy, France and Germany within periods of 2 years (See Table 2.9 for information about the geographical entities grouped under each region).
Observations for these countries were limited to those that were assigned a region within the respective country, otherwise they were excluded from the analysis.
Estimates for Portugal, Israel, Switzerland, Angola, India and a category grouping the remaining 117 countries in our data are omitted from the table. All
specifications contain controls for tax amount and property area. The benchmark category is southern Spain. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.18: Property Tax Payments by Region of Descent for Periods of 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2005 - 2007 2008 - 2010
Share of payments: Early Late Never Late Early Late Never Late
(heckman) (heckman)
Northern Italy 0.006*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 0.008** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.010*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Central Italy 0.006** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.011*** 0.013** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009)
Southern Italy 0.009*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.006** 0.013*** -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.013*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Belgium -0.057*** 0.056*** 0.157*** 0.021*** -0.117*** 0.114*** 0.150*** 0.040**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
Constant 0.211*** 0.752*** 0.160*** 0.676*** 0.442*** 0.496*** 0.152*** 0.296***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012)
Selection (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Observations 93,493 93,493 93,493 93,493 98,548 98,548 98,548 98,548
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
2011 - 2013 2014 - 2016
Share of payments: Early Late Never Late Early Late Never Late
(heckman) (heckman)
Northern Italy 0.014*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.009 0.012*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Central Italy 0.017*** -0.015** -0.014** -0.008 0.009* -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012)
Southern Italy 0.017*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.009 0.012*** -0.006 -0.007** -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Belgium -0.130*** 0.142*** 0.169*** 0.047** -0.085*** 0.107*** 0.123*** 0.025
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.027)
Constant 0.526*** 0.452*** 0.202*** 0.158*** 0.376*** 0.344*** 0.202*** -0.139***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.042)
Selection (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Observations 102,825 102,825 102,825 102,825 112,417 112,417 112,417 112,417
Notes: The table summarizes results from OLS estimations with the share of monthly payments within 36 months made early, late or never
made on the left hand side and dummies for the regions of origin of the individuals’ ancestors within Spain, Italy, France and Germany
within periods of 3 years (See Table 2.9 for information about the geographical entities grouped under each region). Observations for these
countries were limited to those that were assigned a region within the respective country, otherwise they were excluded from the analysis.
The benchmark category is northern Spain, estimates for southern Spain, regions within France, regions within Germany, Portugal, Israel,
Switzerland, Angola, India and a category grouping the remaining 117 countries in our data are omitted from the table. Columns 4, 8, 12 and
16 present outcomes from Heckman two-stage estimations of the share of late payments within 36 months as dependent variable. Heckman
estimations use constructed area, tax amount and property value as independent variables in the selection equation. For these same columns,
the table also shows the p-value of the null hypothesis of no selection bias. All specifications include controls for tax amount and property
area. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 2.2: Property Tax Compliance Correlations - Late Payments
CH
DE
ES
FR
IN
IT
2
2.
2
2.
4
2.
6
2.
8
3
Ta
x 
m
or
al
e 
(W
V
S
)
.425 .43 .435 .44
Share of early payments
AO
BE
CHDEES
FR
IL
IN
ITPT
0
2
4
6
8
10
H
om
ic
id
e 
ra
te
 p
er
 1
00
K
 in
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
.3 .35 .4 .45
Share of early payments
AO
BE
CH
DE
ESFR
IL
IN
IT
PT
-3
-2
-1
0
1
C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
in
de
x
.3 .35 .4 .45
Share of early payments
Notes: The top-left panel uses tax morale indicators from the World Values Survey averaged over
the period 2000-2014. The top-right panel uses homicide rates per 100.000 inhabitants from the
United Nations office for drugs and crime over the period 2000-2012. The lower-left panel uses
the corruption index from Fisman and Miguel (2007). The variable on the x axis in all panels is
the share of late payments made during the whole period of analysis.
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Figure 2.3: Property Tax Compliance Correlations - Non-payments
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Notes: The top-left panel uses tax morale indicators from the World Values Survey averaged over
the period 2000-2014. The top-right panel uses homicide rates per 100.000 inhabitants from the
United Nations office for drugs and crime over the period 2000-2012. The lower-left panel uses
the corruption index from Fisman and Miguel (2007). The variable on the x axis in all panels is
the share of non-payments during the whole period of analysis.
Chapter 3
Salience, Simplification and
Timely Compliance: Experimental
Evidence on the Enforcement of
Speeding Tickets
3.1 Introduction
In many domains, authorities rely on sending notifications to enforce compliance
with outstanding payments. Typically lawyers are involved in drafting these noti-
fications or, at least, there are laws that impose constraints on their format and
content. As a result, payment notifications often appear like complex, convoluted
legal texts. The key information is often presented in a way that is hard to un-
derstand, making it difficult to correctly infer important attributes of the payment
liabilities. This is crucial, as many of these attributes play – at least for a fully
rational, attentive and cognitively unconstrained decision maker – a significant role
in shaping individual responses to the notifications.
This project studies the impact from simplifying information and increasing the
salience of different attributes hidden in such complex legal texts. In particular, we
focus on payment notifications for drivers who receive a speeding ticket.1 We first
1To guide our analysis and ensure its transparency, we registered a pre-analysis plan before the
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explore the payment choice in a simple theoretical framework in the spirit of Heffetz
et al. (2016) and Altmann et al. (2017). Individuals receive a payment notification
and decide if and when to pay. In each period, they compare the (stochastic) oppor-
tunity costs of paying now with the option value of postponing the payment into the
future. If a given payment deadline is missed, an additional penalty applies and thus
increases the costs. A fully informed agent anticipates this effect occurring at the
deadline. However, the payment notification might appear highly complex. Hence,
both the payment deadline itself and the increased costs for missing the deadline
may not be fully salient to all individuals. Based on our model, we then discuss how
a simplified payment notification – that makes the deadline and the extra penalty
more salient – can increase timely payments.
We then test our predictions empirically, analyzing the effect of simplification
and increased salience on the timely payment of speeding tickets. More specifically,
we run a field experiment with the universe of drivers who received speeding tickets
in a suburb of the city of Prague, in the Czech Republic. With the cooperation of
the local authorities, we randomized the inclusion and content of a complementary
cover letter sent along with the regular payment notification to drivers that were
caught speeding. This regular payment notification consists of a heavily convoluted
legal text. Several key parameters – in particular, the payment deadline (15 days
after receiving the ticket) and the additional fine for late payments – are somewhat
hidden in the complex, legal text.
Against this benchmark, we test the effects from adding one-page cover letters,
that simplify the information provided in the legal text and highlight the main
choice-relevant attributes of the notification. The randomized control trial follows
an incomplete 2x2 factorial design: a control group receives only the standard legal
text of the summons. Three different treatment groups get the same standard text
plus a simplifying cover letter. The cover letters make (1) the payment deadline, (2)
the additional penalty, or (3) both attributes very salient.
To get a sense of the extent and direction of the mis-perception of these attributes
in the population, we conduct an online survey among a relevant sample of drivers.
Respondents are confronted with a hypothetical scenario mimicking the setup of the
start of the trial (Dusek et al., 2017).
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field experiment. We then collect their perceptions regarding different attributes of
the setup, including the deadline and the late-pay penalty. This exercise also allows
us to identify the extent to which the cover letters correct the mis-perceptions of
these attributes.
Our results from the field experiment document a positive and persistent effect
from jointly increasing the salience of the deadline and the penalty for late payments.
The cover letter making salient both attributes increases the rate of timely compli-
ance and the proportion of payments made over time with respect to the control
group. Making salient the late-pay penalty only, also increases payments before the
deadline, although to a lesser extent. The effects of this letter do not persist over
time. In contrast, increasing the salience of the deadline alone yields no significant
effects on payments.
The results are consistent with individuals mis-perceiving the penalty for missing
the deadline and, to a much lesser extent, the deadline itself. Consistent with our
theoretical framework and the results from the survey, the cover letters effectively
correct both under- and overestimation of the deadline and the late-pay penalty.
This triggers two different effects that move in opposite directions. Correcting dead-
line underestimation reduces payments before the deadline, whereas reducing overes-
timation has the opposite effect on timely payments. These effects are of similar size,
and thus cancel each other. Similarly, Correcting for under- and overestimation of
the penalty for missing the deadline leads to an increase and reduction of payments
before the deadline respectively. In this case, however, the positive effect on timely
compliance dominates. This links our findings to a growing body of literature that
shows positive effects from making the costs of non-compliance more salient (see,
e.g., Cranor et al., 2018; Dur and Vollaard, 2013; Dwenger et al., 2016; Fellner et al.,
2013).
Our setting further allows us to study the effect of ’traditional’ economic incen-
tives on payment behavior. For this we take advantage of a discontinuous increase
in the amount of the fine after a certain driving speed threshold. This local varia-
tion allows us to implement a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect
of increasing the fine and the costs for missing the deadline on timely compliance.
The answer is not trivial from the perspective of our theoretical model. On the
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one hand increasing the fine reduces payments before the deadline. On the other
hand increasing the late-pay penalty has a positive impact on timely payments. The
empirical results are consistent with a much stronger effect of the fine increase. Our
findings indicate that increasing the fine and the penalty for paying late, reduces
timely payments.
A quick comparison of the absolute value of the effects on timely payments from
both including a cover letter and changing the economic incentives, reveals that
the latter have a much larger impact than the former. Doubling the fine and the
penalty for missing the deadline causes an effect on payments that is almost three
times larger than the effect produced by the most comprehensive cover letter. This
is in line with similar findings in other domains, where economic incentives cause a
larger impact than behaviorally motivated interventions (e.g., Chetty et al., 2014;
Ito et al., 2018).
The present study also contributes to the understanding of attribute salience on
the decision of individuals. A number of studies indicate that the degree of salience
of relevant attributes in the decision process, has significant effects on the choices of
individuals (Bordalo et al., 2013; Chetty et al., 2009; Meiselman, 2018; Taubinsky
and Rees-Jones, 2016). Most notably, our research adds to a nascent literature that
studies the effect of information simplification on behavior. Even though there are a
number of studies analyzing simplification in different domains like savings decisions
(Beshears et al., 2013), college enrollment(Bettinger et al., 2009; Dynarski and Scott-
Clayton, 2008), micro-finances (Drexler et al., 2014), information simplification has
received little attention – in particular, in the domain of legal payment notifications.
The only exception is De Neve et al. (2019) who analyze the effect of information
simplification, combined with deterrence and tax morale texts on tax compliance
in Belgium2. Our study differs from this paper mainly in the focus of our analysis
and the setup of our experiment. While we analyze the salience of the attributes by
providing a cover letter that is complementary to a text available to all individuals,
their paper rather focus on the effect of the content of different texts related to
2A related study from a different area is Persson (2018), who theoretically analyzes how in-
formation simplification affects cognitively biased individuals. The author models the effect of
information overload on decision. She shows that providing an excessive amount of information
negatively affect the choices of inattentive individuals.
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deterrence and tax morale on payments.
From an applied policy perspective, our findings show that information simpli-
fication and increasing attribute salience is a cost-effective enforcement policy. It
reduces the number of cases that move to further enforcement steps (bringing along
additional administrative costs, processing time, etc.), thus saving the enforcement
authority a significant amount of resources. Moreover, it has a direct positive effect
on revenue, as it increases the proportion of payments altogether.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the
institutional context of this study. Section 3.3 discusses a theoretical framework
to model payment decisions. The following Section 3.4 details our experimental
designs. We first present the treatments, predictions as well as the results from a
survey experiment that explores treatment effects on (mis)perceptions. Thereafter
we turn to the results from the RCT. In Section 3.5, we then explore a regression
discontinuity design. After discussing the design and its validity, we present the
main empirical results. The final section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional background
We study the payment of speeding fines issued by the local authorities in Ricany, a
town in the south west of Prague in the Czech Republic. The authorities manage
more than 30 radar systems in the town and in nearby villages which all face heavy
commuting traffic to and from Prague.3 The radars are installed along different
roads with a speed limit of typically 50km/h.4 Each radar measures the speed of
every passing vehicle, takes a digital picture and identifies the number plates of the
car. An enforcement authority then automatically processes the data of cars that
were speeding above a given cutoff (excluding emergency vehicles like ambulances
or police cars).5
Similar to other contexts of traffic law enforcement (see, e.g., Goncalves and
Mello, 2017; Traxler et al., 2018), penalties for speeding increase stepwise in the
3On an average day, the radars used in our analysis, register more than 25,000 drive troughs.
4Among 31 radars, 3 are installed at roads with a speed limit of 40km/h.
5Further details on the institutional setting are discussed in Dusek and Traxler (2019).
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speed. For a speed above a certain enforcement cutoff but less than 20km/h above
the speed limit, car owners are charged with a low fine of 900 CZK (approx. EUR
35 or 3.5% of the average monthly wage). A speed between 20 and 40km/h above
the limit results in an intermediate fine of 1,900 CZK (approx. EUR 75). Speeding
with more than 40km/h above the limit triggers higher penalties and a different
enforcement procedure. In addition, such speeding offenses are very rare (we only
observe one during our trial period). The institutional discussion below as well as
our analysis in the subsequent sections therefore focuses on speeding tickets with
low or medium fines.
Authorities send a summons (‘speeding tickets’) to the registered address of the
vehicle’s owner either by regular mail or by e-mail.6 The speeding tickets communi-
cate the relevant fine – 900 or 1,900 CZK – and a payment deadline of 15 days after
receiving the summons. If the stipulated fine is paid before the deadline, the case is
closed.
If the fine is not paid by the deadline, authorities are expected to initiate a trial-
like process. In case the car owner is convicted, he faces an additional fine bringing
the total cost to 1,500 – 2,500 CZK for low severity cases (speeding up to 20km/h
above the limit) and between 2,500 – 5,000 CZK for medium severity offenses. In
addition, a deduction of demerit points is applied. Accounting for the relatively
high enforcement costs, however, the authorities accept payments of the basic fines
even if they are delayed by one or more weeks. Moreover, roughly 30–60 days after
sending the summons, authorities either send a further mailing (or e-mail) or make
phone calls, which serves as reminder and warning. Only thereafter a formal process
would start.
A key feature of the institutional set-up – which is quite commonly observed
in other enforcement contexts – is the highly convoluted nature of the summons:
it is full of legal terms and relatively lengthy (see Appendix 3.9). The speeding
tickets contain, in addition to numerous legal extracts, information about the time
and date of the traffic violation, the amount of the fine, the payment deadline as
well as information regarding the consequences of missing the deadline. One can
6The electronic mail is sent through an official e-governance platform called ‘databox’. Mostly
companies make use of databox, although some individuals also choose to use this service.
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question, whether the text conveys the relevant information regarding the fines, the
deadline for paying it, and the consequences of missing the deadline. The latter
are summarized in the vague phrase “... the office will continue investigating the
offense”. It requires knowledge of administrative law to understand that the speeding
violation will be processed under a different legal procedure with several possible
outcomes, among which a payment of a higher fine is the most likely. Despite being
explicitly stated thrice, the salience of the payment deadline might be compromised,
too, by the plethora of legal details in the text. The next section discusses what the
limited salience of these attributes implies for individuals’ choices.
3.3 Theoretical framework
We consider a simple model of an individual’s decision about if and when to pay
a speeding ticket. The driver receives a speeding ticket in period t = 0. The
ticket stipulates a fine f , a payment deadline, T , and an (expected) penalty for late
payments, K. 7 Paying the fine is associated with some transaction and opportunity
costs ct. After the realization of these costs, which are i.i.d. and drawn from a given
distribution F , the driver decide whether to pay now, in period t, or whether to wait
another period and hope for a lower cost realization in the future. The incentive to
wait and postpone the payment, however, is constrained by the deadline T . If the
deadline passes without having paid the fine, the individual’s (expected) payment
obligation increases. The costs for paying the speeding ticket in period t are then
given by C(t), with
C(t) =
ct + f if t ≤ Tct + f +K if t > T
The structure of this problem in fact describes many situations with (legal) payment
notifications that communicate a given payment deadline and consequences for non-
compliance. As discussed in Altmann et al. (2017), the structure also captures a
much broader set of economically relevant choices of costly task completion under a
7Assuming risk neutrality, one could consider the case where a driver expects to get away with
just paying the ‘regular’ fine f after the deadline with probability 1 − p. With probability p, she
would expect to pay f plus an additional penalty, κ. The expected late pay penalty would then
equal K = pκ.
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deadline (e.g., submitting work duties before a due date, buying a product before a
price increase). Several recent studies analyze this dynamic problem (e.g., Altmann
et al., 2017; Heffetz et al., 2016; Taubinsky, 2014) following the logic of traditional
job-search models (e.g., McCall, 1970; Mortensen, 1970; Stigler, 1961). Below we
will augment the framework from these studies by introducing non-salience (or mis-
perceptions) regarding the deadline as well as the late pay penalty.
Benchmark Predictions
For the benchmark case of a full informed, rational individual, the optional solution
to the problem is characterized by a cutoff rule (for analytical details see, e.g.,
Altmann et al., 2017). For any given period t ≤ T , there exists a cutoff cˆt such
that the fine is paid whenever the cost ct is below the cutoff. When the realized
costs are higher, the agent prefers not to pay but to wait for the next period t+ 1.
Once the deadline gets closer, however, the option value of further postponing the
payment shrinks: there are fewer periods left that could yield a low cost draw before
the payment obligation increases at the deadline. The cutoff cˆt is thus increasing in
t for t ≤ T . In turn, this means that the probability of paying the fine in period t
(conditional on not having paid before) increases up to the deadline.
Economic Incentives
A comparative static that is worth discussing concerns the fine f . Consider the
decision to pay a ticket at the last day (i.e., right before the deadline). Would a
rational agent be more likely to pay the fine for a minor offense or the higher fine
for an intermediate speeding offense (see Section 3.2)? Intuitively, one would expect
to observe less compliance (i.e., timely payment) with higher fines. Analytically,
however, the answer is complex. Among others, this is due to the fact that in our
context the late-pay penalty K increases with f (i.e., ∂K/∂f > 0; see the previous
Section). This makes it, cet. par., more costly to ‘miss the deadline’. In addition,
higher costs also reduce the option value to further postpone the payment into the
future. Hence, in contrast to the higher costs (of a higher fine) which make a payment
less likely in the (pre-deadline) presence, there are also forces that render a delayed
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payment less attractive. The comparative static is therefore theoretically ambiguous
and remains an empirical question (see Appendix 3.7 for a formal derivation of the
comparative static).
Mis-perceptions
Accounting for the complex legal text of the speeding ticket, we next consider the
case where both, (i) the deadline T and/or (ii) the costs of missing it, K, might not
be fully salient to the driver. Following Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2016), we model
possible mis-perceptions by an individual that considers the deadline T˜ (θT ) = θTT
and a penalty for late payments, K˜(θK) = θKK. The two θ parameters – which
are assumed to satisfy 0 < θ < ∞ – capture whether an individual over- (θ > 1)
or underestimates (θ < 1) the deadline and the late pay penalty, respectively. The
benchmark case from above is nested by θK = θT = 1.
It is straightforward to show that an individual’s likelihood of paying the fine
before the deadline T , is cet. par. increasing in θK : the higher the perceived costs
of missing the deadline, the more likely the individual will pay in any pre-deadline
period t. Individuals that over- [under-] estimate K, are thus more [less] likely
to comply with the payment deadline. In a similar vein, one can show that the
likelihood of observing a pre-deadline T payment is cet. par. lower for individuals
with θT > 1. Intuitively, an individual who overestimates the deadline length (T˜ >
T ) expects to have more opportunities to draw low costs ct before the late-pay
penalty kicks in. In any period t ≤ T she will consider a higher option value from
postponing the payment (implying a lower cutoff, cˆθT>1t < cˆ
θT=1
t ). As a consequence,
it is less likely that she will have paid by the (true) deadline.
The case for someone who underestimates the deadline (T˜ < T ) is less clear.
On the one hand, this person will feel ‘more pressured’ during the first T˜ periods
after t = 0 (anticipating a lower option value from postponing and thus accepting
higher cost realizations, cˆθT<1t > cˆ
θT=1
t ).
8 Hence, as compared to an individual who
8In fact, one can show that for any period t ≤ T˜ the agent considers a cutoff cˆθT<1t which
equals to the cutoffs cˆ
θT=1
τ of a fully rational agent (without mis-perceptions), for any τ−T = t− T˜
(Altmann et al., 2017, compare Appendix A.3 in). To put it more technically: during the first T˜
periods, the mis-perceiving agent acts as a fully rational agent during the last T˜ periods before the
deadline T .
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anticipates the correct deadline, he will be more likely to have paid by period T˜ .
On the other hand, for periods T˜ < t ≤ T , an individual with correct deadline
perceptions might be more likely to pay (conditional on not having paid before).
This is due to the fact that (a) the proximity to the (correct) deadline drives up
ct (see above); and (b) that the individual with mis-perceptions now acts as if she
would face the late-pay penalty (which tends to lower her propensity to pay relative
to the agent with θT = 1). The bottomline is that during this period there might
be a catch-up, such that the overall effect of underestimating the deadline on the
likelihood of observing a pre-deadline payment is ambiguous.
3.4 The Field Experiment
Our experiment varied the inclusion and content of a complementary cover letter that
was sent, along with the standard summons, to drivers that were speeding (above
the enforcement speed limit). These brief, one-page cover letters simplified the
main information from the speeding ticket and made salient two particular elements
that are critical for the payment decision: the payment deadline (T ) and/or the
consequences for missing it (K). In cooperation with the enforcement authority, we
randomly assigned speeding offenses into a control group or one of three treatment
groups described below.
3.4.1 Treatments
The control (C ) group only received the standard legal notification (i.e., the sum-
mons) without a cover letter. All three treatment groups received a cover letter
on top of this standard notification. The cover letter of our Deadline + Penalty
(D&P ) treatment clearly stated the deadline for paying the speeding ticket and
the consequences of missing that deadline. The relevant excerpts of the cover letter
read “Please pay the amount in full and make sure it is credited to the city’s account
within 15 days after receiving this summons.” followed by “If you do not pay the
whole amount the office will continue investigating the offense. The amount that
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you will potentially have to pay may be as high as 2,500 CZK”.9
To study which of these two elements has a stronger impact on the payment
behavior, we implemented two additional treatments that exposed speeding ticket
receivers to increased salience of either the payment deadline or the consequences of
missing it (the experimental design is summarized in figure 3.1). The cover letter
from our Deadline (D) treatment contained the same text from above stating the
deadline, but not the text related to the penalties of not paying in time. Whereas the
text on the letter from the Penalty (P) treatment only mentioned the consequences
of late payments (without repeating the specific deadline). Otherwise, the wording
of the texts in all the letters was identical. (Appendix 3.9 contains the full text of
the cover letters for all the three treatments.)
Figure 3.1: Experimental design
 
Standard notification + 
Salience/simplification cover letter 
Deadline + penalty Deadline 
Penalty 
 
+ 
 
Control 
Standard 
notification 
only 
 
9For medium-severity speeding violations (i.e., for a speed in the range of 21 - 40km/h above
the limit), this part reads ‘as high as 5,000 CZK’ Bold font was also used in the actual cover letter
in the same parts of the text as in these two text extracts
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3.4.2 Predictions
Based on the discussion from Section 3.3 we can immediately derive several predic-
tions. First, we expect the treatments that make the penalties more salient (the P
and the D&P treatment) to increase the salience of K. Relative to the control group,
both treatments should reduce mis-perceptions, thus shifting K˜ towards the true K.
(In terms of the notation from Section 3.3: the treatments will push θK towards
unity.) As discussed above, this should increase the rate of timely (pre-deadline)
payments, for drivers that tend to underestimate K (i.e., whenever K˜ < K). The
opposite prediction emerges for drivers who overestimate K. Among the latter,
the treatments would decrease the rate of timely payments (relative to the control
group).
Second, the impact of making the deadline more salient (the D and the D&P
treatment), again depends on the direction of the mis-perception. For drivers who
overestimate the deadline length (T˜ > T ), the treatment should increase the rate of
timely payments (i.e., payments within 15 days). As discussed in Section 3.3, the
prediction for those who underestimate the deadline (T˜ < T ) is ambiguous. For this
case we could, in principle, observe a lower rate of timely payments.
Third, there is scope for an interaction effect. The impact of the D&P treatment
on payment rates might be larger than the sum of the effects from the D- and the P -
treatment, whenever both treatments work into the same direction. If, for instance,
drivers underestimate the late-pay penalty and overestimate the deadline (i.e., if
K˜ < K and T˜ > T ) we could, in principle, observe a positive interaction.
3.4.3 Survey Experiment
The predictions make clear that the treatment impact hinges on the ‘direction’ of
the individuals’ mis-perceptions. To study this point empirically, we conducted
a survey experiment that exposed a sample of N = 1609 individuals (aged 18 or
above and holding a driving license) to our different treatments. It was conducted
online with a professional survey provider that maintains a panel of respondents
that is representative for the Czech population. Our survey participants were on
average 43 years old, half of them were females and 18% had a university degree. All
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observable characteristics are balanced across treatments, suggesting that random
treatment assignment worked (see Table 3.7).
The participants were first exposed to a hypothetical scenario description which
explained that they were detected speeding at 16km/h above the speed limit. In a
second step, they were randomly assigned to either the standard notification (con-
trol treatment) or to one of the three cover letters from our RCT (followed by the
standard notification).10 Thereafter – and without the opportunity to click back
into the text of the summons or the cover letter – individuals were asked questions
about their perceptions regarding the deadline (T ) and the penalty for missing it
(K). The survey experiment thus provides a measure of the extent and direction
of mis-perceptions (in the control group) as well as the treatments’ effect on these
mis-perceptions.
Perceptions about the deadline
Participants perceptions about the parameter T were assessed with a question asking
“when do you think you have to pay the full amount of the fine?”. The four response
options were ‘within 7’, 15, 30, or ‘within 60 or more’ days after the deadline. Using
binary response dummies as dependent variables (e.g., T7i indicating that individual
i responded indicating ‘within 7 days’) we then estimate linear probability models
of the form:
T7i = β0 + β1Deadlinei + β2Penaltyi + β3Deadline&Penaltyi +Xiγ + εi (1)
The constant, β0, thus indicate the fraction giving this response in the control treat-
ment. The effect from exposure to one of the three treatments is captured by the
estimates for β1, β2 and β3. We will estimate such models with and without including
a control vector Xi. Estimation results are presented in Table 3.1.
Comparing first the constant terms across Columns, one observes that in the
baseline treatment 69.1%, a clear majority, provide the correct answer (see Column
3). The high share of correct responses suggest that, despite the convoluted legal
10The web display of the mailings used exactly the same layout as the letters used in the field
experiment.
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nature of the summons, the deadline (which is noted in three different parts of the
text; see appendix 3.9) was sufficiently salient to our survey participants. Put differ-
ently, there is only a modest level of deadline mis-perceptions: 13.1% underestimate
the deadline length (Column 1) whereas 16.6% (Column 5) plus 1.2% (Column 7)
overestimate it. Hence, the scope for the treatments to reduce mis-perceptions is
limited. Notwithstanding, the estimates document a consistent impact from the D
and the D&P treatments.
Table 3.1: Treatment Effects on Deadline Perceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Responses: within 7 days within 15 days within 30 days within 60+ days
Deadline -0.086*** -0.088*** 0.169*** 0.171*** -0.078*** -0.077*** -0.005 -0.005
(0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.007) (0.007)
Penalty -0.028 -0.029 -0.016 -0.015 0.051* 0.052* -0.007 -0.007
(0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.007) (0.007)
Deadline & Penalty -0.073*** -0.073*** 0.148*** 0.148*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.131*** 0.163*** 0.691*** 0.620*** 0.166*** 0.194*** 0.012** 0.023*
(0.017) (0.028) (0.023) (0.044) (0.019) (0.037) (0.006) (0.013)
F-Tests (p-values):
D = P 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.656 0.732
D = D&P 0.394 0.343 0.421 0.377 0.909 0.913 0.503 0.453
P = D&P 0.020 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.270 0.270
Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
Notes: The table presents LPM estimates of equations following the structure from (1). N = 1,609. Control variables include
age, gender, and education dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
The two treatments that make the deadline more salient increase the number
of correct responses by about 15 to 17 percentage points. The P treatment, in
contrast, has no effect (Column 3). The estimates further show that the increase
in correct perceptions is achieved by a reduction in the fraction of respondents that
underestimate the deadline length (Column 1) as well as a reduction in the share
of individuals that expect a deadline length of 30 days (Column 5). All estimated
treatment effects are virtually unchanged if one includes control variables. This
pattern is reassuring and again consistent with successful randomization.
To wrap-up, the survey indicates that the D and D&P treatments successfully
increase the salience of the correct deadline. The increase in correct perceptions,
however, is associated with both, a (i) reduction in over- (θT > 1) and (ii) a reduction
in underestimations (θT < 1) of the deadline length. The theoretical framework from
Section 3.3 from above suggests that the former effect (i) would increase the rate
of payments within 15 days. While the latter effect (ii) is ambiguous, it could in
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principle run against the former. The survey evidence therefore suggests that the
impact of the D and D&P treatments on timely payments might be small or even
zero.
Perceptions about the late-pay penalty
Let us now turn to the perceptions regarding the late-pay penalty (K). Most re-
spondents are well aware of the fact that not paying the ticket before the deadline
leads to a penalty. In the baseline treatment, 81.2% expect an increase in the pay-
ment obligation (see Column 1, Table 3.2). LPM estimates further show that the
two treatments that highlight the penalty (i.e., P and D&P ) further increase this
share by 6 and 9 percentage points. The deadline treatment (D), in contrast, has
no effect (Columns 1 and 2). Hence, this is a first piece of evidence indicating that
the P and D&P treatment increase the expected penalty K (for the interpretation
of K in expectation terms, see fn. 7).
Columns (3) – (8) explore different responses to the question ‘‘what would be the
total amount you would eventually have to pay?’. (Note that the question does not
directly refer to the parameter K but rather asks about f +K. Our motivation for
doing so is that the summons as well as our cover letters talk about the increased
total payment obligation (i.e., the level) rather than the increase (the difference).)11
The constant terms from Columns (3), (5) and (7) indicate a pronounced level of
mis-perceptions in the amount of post-deadline payment obligations. As compared
to the more modest deadline mis-perceptions discussed above, there is also a larger
share of respondents that underestimates f+K: 53% expect a penalty of 2,000 CZK
or less (Column 3). In addition, 36% anticipate a penalty of 3,000 CZK or more
(Column 7).
The P and the D&P treatment strongly alter these mis-perceptions. The share
of respondents expecting 2,500 CZK increases, from a baseline of 11%, by 42 and
47 percentage points, respectively (Column 5). The shift in perceptions is primarily
due to a drop in underestimations (−30 to −34 percentage points, see Column 3).
11Note further that individuals, who did not expect an increase in the penalty (who responded
‘no’ to the question discussed above), were not asked about the expected post-deadline payment
obligation. The estimates assigned these individuals to the ≤ 2000 response.
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However, the P and D&P treatment also lowers overestimations (-13 percentage
points, see Column 7). All these effects remain unchanged when we control for
individual characteristics12
Table 3.2: Treatment Effects on Penalty Perceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Responses Expect higher costs ≤ 2000 CZK 2500 CZK ≥ 3000 CZK
Deadline 0.007 0.005 0.063* 0.058* -0.039* -0.037* -0.025 -0.021
(0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035) (0.020) (0.021) (0.034) (0.034)
Penalty 0.065** 0.064** -0.295*** -0.298*** 0.423*** 0.423*** -0.127*** -0.125***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Deadline & penalty 0.091*** 0.090*** -0.339*** -0.342*** 0.467*** 0.467*** -0.127*** -0.125***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
Constant 0.812*** 0.834*** 0.530*** 0.477*** 0.111*** 0.131*** 0.359*** 0.391***
(0.019) (0.033) (0.025) (0.045) (0.016) (0.036) (0.024) (0.044)
F-Tests (p-values):
D = P 0.024 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
D = D&P 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
P = D&P 0.242 0.238 0.127 0.126 0.208 0.206 0.999 0.992
Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
Notes: The table presents LPM estimates of equations following the structure from (1). N = 1,609. The dependent variable in
Columns (1) – (2) is a dummy indicating that an individual responded yes to the question ‘If you do not pay the full amount of
the fine by the deadline, would you expect to pay a higher fine?’. Columns (3) – (8) are based on subsequent question regarding the
late-pay penalty. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) captures responses indicating 1,500, 2,000 CZK, as well as responses
of individuals that answered ’no’ when asked if they would expect a higher fine if they did not pay by the deadline. Columns (5)
and (6) indicate responses of 2500 CZK and Columns (7) and (8) pair response with 3,000, 3,500, 4,500 and more than 4,500 CZK.
Control variables include age, gender, and education dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01.
Similar effects are observed for the survey participants’ expectations regarding
demerit points (a further element of the late-pay penalty). In the baseline treatment,
32% expect to get demerit points for missing the deadline. In the P and D&P
treatments, this rate increases by 30 percentage points (see Table 3.8 in the Appendix
for the full estimates).
Together with the findings from above, this suggests that the treatments which
make the late-pay penalty more salient, should trigger a deterrence effect. Firstly,
and quite generally, the P and D&P treatment effects on expectations and percep-
tions appear much stronger than the comparable effects for the deadline treatments.
As in the case of the deadline treatments, the penalty treatments trigger some op-
posing effects, too: they not only reduce the share of individuals underestimating
the costs of missing the deadline, but also lower the fraction that overestimates it.
Qualitatively, however, the former effect is much strong. Moreover, the treatments
12One further observation is hard to rationalize: the deadline treatment seems to shift mis-
perceptions towards an underestimation of the payment obligations; however, these effects are
relatively small and only weakly significant.
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have unambiguous effects on several other dimensions of K (demerit points and the
likelihood p, see fn. 7). The survey evidence therefore suggest that one might expect
the treatments to increase the share of timely, pre-deadline payments.
Finally, the potential interaction effects of the D&P treatment – i.e., whether
this intervention would yield a larger effect as the sum of the D and P treatment
alone – are hard to assess based on the survey results. It is worth nothing, however,
that none of the treatment effects reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are significantly
different between the un-interacted and the interacted treatments (see the F-tests
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2).
3.4.4 RCT Implementation and Sample
Between November 2017 and April 2019 we randomly assigned N = 50,524 speeding
offenses to one of our treatment branches (control, deadline, penalty or deadline &
penalty). We excluded high severity violations and speeding offenses committed by
excused public service vehicles (see Section 3.2). Due to a technical problem in the
course of the trial, no observations were assigned to the deadline & penalty treatment
for a period of three months (between August and November 2018). After the
error was corrected, we re-balanced the proportion of subsequent speeding offenses
assigned to each treatment, so that by the end of the trial the number of observations
across treatments would be balanced. We account for this issue in all our estimations
below by controlling for the week the tickets were sent.
For each speeding violation, we have a significant amount of information that
allows us to track the whole history of the ticket’s enforcement process. Our data
include, among other information, the vehicle’s speed at the time of the offense, the
amount of the fine, the date and time of the speeding offense, the date the ticket is
generated, sent, received and eventually paid by the driver among (see Table 3.3).
Notably, speeding infractions happen mostly around midday, the average driving
speed captured by the radars is 65km/h (15km/h above the speed limit). After
being sent, it takes about 5 days for an average ticket to be received by the driver.
Almost half of the offenses are committed by vehicles belonging to a company, which
means that the speeding ticket is sent to the company the car is registered to. The
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rest are privately owned vehicles. 13% of the cars were caught speeding more than
once, and were therefore treated multiple times. It is also important to note that
the bulk of our observations come from low severity offenses. Only 7% (3,196) of
violations are of medium severity. The table also reveals that randomization worked
as intended. All the variables are balanced across groups with only a few exceptions
for punctual cases.
Table 3.3: Sumamry Statistics Across Treatments
Total Control Deadline Penalty Deadline & P-value
penalty
Average measured speed 64.61 64.58 64.57 64.65 64.66 0.601
(5.203) (5.344) (5.379) (5.275) (4.674)
Average fine amount (CZK) 836.3 834.9 835.5 835.5 840.0 0.037
(230.4) (234.2) (231.6) (231.9) (221.6)
Hour of the day 12.78 12.83 12.87 12.83 12.55 0.814
(4.903) (4.996) (5.044) (5.035) (4.404)
Days between sending and reception 5.045 5.069 5.098 5.022 4.974 0.763
(6.159) (6.490) (5.887) (5.846) (6.422)
% low severity offenses 0.937 0.933 0.935 0.934 0.948 0.363
(0.243) (0.250) (0.247) (0.249) (0.222)
% tickets to cars owned by 0.456 0.448 0.448 0.460 0.470 0.077
corporations (0.498) (0.497) (0.497) (0.498) (0.499)
% tickets sent through databox 0.395 0.390 0.386 0.397 0.410 0.293
(0.489) (0.488) (0.487) (0.489) (0.492)
% vehicles treated multiple times 0.133 0.137 0.136 0.134 0.123 0.380
(0.339) (0.344) (0.343) (0.341) (0.328)
Number of tickets 50,524 13,830 13,136 13,069 10,489
Number of vehicles 40,993 12,788 12,188 12,123 9,739
Notes: Standard errors are written in parenthesis. Last column of the table present p-values from F-tests for equality of
the respective variable across the treatment groups
3.4.5 Results
We begin with a descriptive analysis. Figure 3.2 illustrates the cumulative payment
rates across treatment conditions. The image is scaled to show the first 3 to 21
days after receiving the summons (Figure 3.4 in the appendix covers a longer time
period). The figure shows that, as expected, some cover letters were more successful
in inducing individuals to pay the tickets on time than others.
Treatment D has no effect on increasing pre-deadline payments as compared to
the control group. Treatments P and D&P , on the other hand, increase payments
before the deadline with respect to the control group. The effect of treatment P is
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative Response Rates by Treatment
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Note: the payment deadline (15 days) is indicated with the red vertical
line. The figure shows the cumulative response rate between the 3rd and
21st day after receiving the summons, for the control and each of the
treatment groups.
stronger in the first days after the letter is received, and vanishes right before the
deadline. The impact of the combined treatment D&P persists over time, even after
the deadline has passed. These graphical results already confirm the expectations
of low to null effects when increasing the salience of the deadline, and a positive
impact on timely payments when the penalty for late payments is made salient.
To analyze these effects in detail, we (parametrically) estimate the impact of our
treatments on the probability of payment within different periods of time. Table 3.4
presents results of linear probability model estimations of the form:
yiτ = β0 + β1Deadlinei + β2Penaltyi + β3Deadline&penaltyi +Xiγ +Wδ + ei (2)
where yiτ is a dummy taking the value of one if a payment was made within a time
interval of τ = {15 days, 30 days, any time} after receiving the speeding ticket13.
β1 to β3 capture the effect of our treatments on the dependent variable, and Xi is a
vector of controls and W is a set of dummies for the week the tickets were sent.
13In the pre-analysis plan, we also considered estimating responses within 60 and 100 days. See
table 3.9 in the appendix for results over these time periods
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Consistent with the graphical analysis, the deadline treatment D does not have a
significant effect on payments before the deadline (or any other time intervals from
the table). Results do not change when adding a set of controls in columns 2, 4
and 6. This null effect is consistent with the survey evidence suggesting that (i)
most individuals have a correct perception of the deadline (see Section 3.4.3) and
(ii) treatment D produces two effects of similar size on payments that go in opposite
directions, therefore canceling each other. From Section 3.4.3 we have that treat-
ment D effectively corrects deadline mis-perceptions by reducing both under- and
overestimations of the deadline. Here we observe that these changes in perceptions
affect payment decisions according to the predictions from Section 3.3. By reducing
deadline overestimation (T˜ < T ), D increases payments before the deadline. At the
same time, the treatment discourages payments in early periods after receiving the
ticket. These effects must be of similar size, therefore, we do not observe a significant
increase in timely compliance from this treatment.
Table 3.4: Probability of Payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payments: 15 days 30 days Any payment
Deadline 0.006 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Penalty 0.010* 0.008* 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Deadline & penalty 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.013** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.010**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant 0.751*** 1.166*** 0.771*** 1.173*** 0.909*** 1.214***
(0.023) (0.036) (0.022) (0.034) (0.015) (0.030)
F-Tests (p-values):
D = P 0.501 0.389 0.377 0.224 0.441 0.447
D = D&P 0.026 0.004 0.045 0.004 0.003 0.009
P = D&P 0.092 0.030 0.196 0.065 0.017 0.048
Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes
Observations 50,524 47,852 50,524 47,852 50,524 47,852
Notes: The table presents LPM estimates of equations following the structure from (2). All specifica-
tions contain dummies for the week the speeding ticket was sent. Specifications 2, 4 and 6 include a
vector of variables controlling for severity of the offense, plate number of the vehicle, day of the week
when the offense took place, holidays, number of days between the offense and both ticket sending and
reception, hour of the day, measured speed at the time of the offense, amount of the fine, direction of the
drive through (from or to Prague), whether the ticket was sent through regular mail, whether the ticket
was issued to a vehicle that belongs to a company. Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered
at the vehicle level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
In contrast, the two treatments that make the penalty salient (P and D&P)
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cause a significant increase in timely compliance with respect to the control group
(Column 1). Making salient the penalty for not paying before the deadline alone (P)
increases timely payments by 1 percentage points, whereas the effect of the combined
treatment D&P is 2 pp. Relative to the control group, this is a 1.3 and 2.6 percent
increase. The survey evidence indicates that these effects are driven mostly by the
correction in underestimation of the late-pay penalty (K). On average, individuals
underestimate the penalty for missing the deadline to a considerable extent. P and
D&P effectively increase its salience and reduces underestimation of this parameter,
which triggers a deterrence effect that increases payments before the deadline (see
Section 3.4.3). There is however, an effect working in the opposite direction, as
the treatments also reduce overestimation of K, and consequently, payments made
before the deadline. However, the extent of overestimation of the penalty seems to
be small (see Section 3.4.3) and thus the positive effect dominates and produces an
overall positive impact in payments before the deadline. It is reassuring to observe
that all results in the table remain the same after the introduction of controls.14
It is interesting to see that the effect of the D&P treatment is significantly dif-
ferent from that of the other two treatments (see the post-estimation tests on the
lower panel of the table). This suggests that correcting the mis-perception of T and
K at the same time has a somewhat magnifying effect not only on timely payments,
but also payments in general. Columns 3 to 6 in the table show that the effect of
treatment D&P persists over time (see table 3.9 in the appendix for estimations
of payments within longer periods of time), and remains at 1.4 pp (1.0 pp when
introducing controls in column 6) when looking at the whole trial period .
In a next step we turn to the duration analysis of ticket payments. For this we
estimate Cox proportional hazard models with the following structure:
h(t) = h0(t)exp(β0+β1Deadline+β2Penalty+β3Deadline&penalty+Xγ+Wδ) (3)
where h(t) is the hazard rate for paying the ticket in t and h0(t) is the baseline hazard
function. We estimate the equations with truncation at 15, 30 and 60 days after
receiving the ticket. Table 3.5 presents the outcomes of the estimations. Results
14Due to missing values in the control variables, the number of observations is smaller in the
specifications where controls are included in Table 3.4
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are in line with the graphical and the estimation analysis from above. Individuals
that received the letter making salient both the deadline and the penalty for late
payments (D&P) exhibit a higher probability of making payments. On average this
group has a hazard rate that is 6 to 7 percent higher (depending on the number of
days after which the data is truncated) than the hazard rate in the control group.
Estimates of the ratios for this treatment slightly increase when a set of controls
are introduced. Hazard ratios from the penalty treatment P are smaller than those
from D&P, and only become slightly significant with the introduction of controls15.
There are no significant effects in the Deadline treatment with respect to the control
group.
Table 3.5: Duration to Payment
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
15 days 30 days 60 days
Deadline 0.990 0.992 0.995 0.994 1.004 0.998
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Penalty 1.025 1.038* 1.026 1.039* 1.031 1.042*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Deadline & penalty 1.060** 1.064** 1.064** 1.066** 1.072*** 1.073***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Post-est. tests (p-values):
D = P 0.141 0.049 0.190 0.054 0.254 0.066
D = D&P 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.004
P = D&P 0.195 0.331 0.165 0.295 0.131 0.229
Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes
Observations 46,971 44,299 46,971 44,299 46,971 44,299
Notes: The table presents hazard ratios from estimations of Cox proportional hazard models following
the structure of (3). All specifications contain dummies for the week the speeding ticket was sent. Speci-
fications 2, 4 and 6 include a vector of variables controlling for severity of the offense, plate number of the
vehicle, day of the week when the offense took place, holidays, number of days between the offense and
both ticket sending and reception, hour of the day, measured speed at the time of the offense, amount of
the fine, direction of the drive through (from or to Prague), whether the ticket was sent through regular
mail, whether the ticket was issued to a vehicle that belongs to a company. Standard errors given in
parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
In sum, increasing the salience of the deadline does not cause a significant in-
crease in payments as compared to the control group due to the similar opposing
effects that are at work when deadline mis-perceptions are corrected. On the other
15The number of observations is smaller in specifications including controls in Table 3.5 due
to missing values in these variables. Also the smaller number of observations with respect to
estimations in Table 3.4 is because the estimation procedure excludes observations with payments
made the same day the ticket is received (i.e. zero duration).
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hand, increasing the salience of the penalty for late payments significantly increases
timely compliance. Interestingly, jointly making salient both attributes is particu-
larly effective in inducing individuals to pay their tickets on time. It also encourages
ticket payments in the long run. Evidence also suggests that simplification messages
per se (i.e. cover letters) seem to have minor effects. Otherwise we would have
observed at least some effects from the deadline treatment (D).
Cost-benefit analysis
Even though the effects of our treatments might seem small in magnitude, they
have important revenue implications for the authorities in our setting. Assuming
that the authorities implement our most successful treatment (D&P), a simple back
of the envelope cost-benefit analysis reveals that simplifying information and making
salient both the deadline and the penalty for missing it, is a cost-effective interven-
tion. It saves the traffic authorities considerable amounts of money in enforcement
procedures.
As mentioned in section 3.2, if a ticket is not paid by the deadline, authorities
start additional enforcement procedures. For this, workers at the office of traffic
have to review the follow-up process in each case. These procedures take about
15 minutes per speeding ticket.16 Average hourly wage in the traffic department
is about 200 CZK, thus the processing of each unpaid ticket amounts to 50 CZK.
Hence, the increase in timely payments caused by the cover letter (0.02) translate
into a reduction of 1 CZK in administrative costs. Beyond saving enforcement costs,
the cover letter also increases the probability of making any payment by 0.014. With
an average fine of 830 CZK, this amounts to an increase in revenue by 12 CZK per
ticket. Putting these numbers together yields a marginal benefit of 13 CZK.
As for the marginal cost, it is zero for tickets sent via email, which corresponds
to 40% of all tickets (see table 3.3). The cost of printing and sending the letter
through regular mail is at most 2 CZK, meaning that the average marginal cost is
about 1 CZK. Thus, the cover letter yields a net marginal benefit of 12 CZK for the
16Information about hourly wages, processing time for unpaid tickets, and additional informa-
tion mentioned below was obtained through conversations with the traffic authorities of Ricany
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authorities. Moreover, the radar system generates roughly 3,000 tickets per month,
which translates into a monthly net benefit for the authorities of 36,000 CZK.
3.5 Regression Discontinuity Design
To study the effect of ‘traditional’ economic incentives on payment behavior of ticket
receivers, we take advantage of the speed threshold at which speeding is classified as
an intermediate rather than a minor offense. Recall from Section 3.2 that individuals
face a low penalty (900 CZK) if they are caught driving at a speed of at most 20km/h
above the speed limit (with a total cost of at most 2500 CZK when paying after the
deadline). The amount of the fine jumps to 1900 CZK (with a total cost of at most
5000 CZK when paying late) if the speed slightly exceeds 20km/h above the limit.
That is, at this speed threshold, the amount of the fine discontinuously increases by
111%.
This local variation allows us to implement a regression discontinuity design
(RDD) to identify how an increase in the fine and the late-pay penalty affects pay-
ment behavior. Recall from Section 3.3 that our theoretical framework provides no
clear prediction for this effect: in principle, the effect could go either way. On the
one hand a higher fine f , would cet. par. reduce payments before the deadline.
On the other hand, the associated increase in the costs for late payments reduces
the incentives to postpone paying the ticket into the future and makes missing the
deadline more costly, which in turn would increase timely payments.
3.5.1 Validity of Design
The running variable of our RDD is thus measured speed. For the identification
strategy to produce unbiased estimates, we need to be sure that individuals cannot
fully control the speed at which they drive to keep it just below the threshold. We
argue that two important features in our setting ensure that this is the case.
First, the way speed is measured by the radars makes it difficult for drivers to
aim for a specific speed level. A Radar system consist of a pair of measuring devices
placed along a strip of road at about 500 meters away from each other. Each device
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measures the time at which the vehicle passes in front of it. Speed is then calculated
from the time difference between the two measurements. This makes aiming for a
specific driving speed challenging. It would require drivers to keep a constant speed
between the two devices and to have full knowledge about how the radar systems
work, which is unlikely.
Second, even if drivers are fully informed of the functioning of the radars and
skilled enough to aim for a particular speed just below that of the medium severity
threshold throughout the whole strip of road, they are not aware of the speed level
that is relevant for the allocation of the fines. In order to account for potential
measurement errors, authorities apply a correction procedure to the measured speed
of the vehicles in favor of the drivers before assigning them the corresponding fine.
The correction consists on rounding and subtracting 3km/h to the measured speed
of the cars. This means that the effective threshold at which offenses go from low
to medium severity is actually 23km/h above the speed limit. Since this de facto
correction procedure is hardly known, we consider sorting around the threshold very
unlikely.
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 in the appendix provide graphical evidence of the validity of
our approach. The figures show that the density of the running variable is smooth
around the threshold. Additional balancing tests of observables at both sides of the
threshold are provided in Table 3.10 in the appendix. Apart from some selected
cases, the results confirm that observables are balanced around the threshold, which
together with the outcomes of the graphical analysis, make clear that there is no
systematic sorting around the threshold17. Therefore we can be confident that the
identification strategy will allow us to obtain unbiased estimates.
3.5.2 Results
We proceed first with a graphical analysis of how a cost increase affects the proba-
bility of payment. Figure 3.3 shows how increasing the amount of the fine and the
late-pay penalty affects the probability of payment within different periods of time.
Increasing the fine from 900 to 1900 (and correspondingly the cost of late payments
17See Dusek and Traxler (2019) for additional validity checks for an RDD approach around this
threshold
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from at most 2500 CZK to at most 5000 CZK) significantly reduces the probability
of observing payments before the deadline of 15 days. We obtain a similar figure
for payments within 30 days. The monetary cost change does not seem to affect
neither the probability of paying within 60 days nor the probability of making any
payment. These graphical results indicate that an increase in the cost of the fine
(f) has a negative effect on timely compliance.
Figure 3.3: Probability of payment - full sample
Notes: The graphs show the average probability of payment within
bins of width 0.5. Measured speed in the horizontal axis is cen-
tered around the 23km/h threshold above the speed limit. Local
polynomials of degree one fitted on both sides of the threshold were
estimated using triangle kernel and bandwidth calculated using MSE
optimal bandwidth selection procedures by Calonico et al. (2014).
Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
To analyze in more detail the extent of the effect of a monetary cost increase
on payments, we implemented a regression discontinuity design around the speed
threshold (23km/h) that triggers an increase in the fine and the late-pay penalty.
For this we estimated non-parametrically the following equation:
yiτ = αDi + g+(si)Di + g−(si)(1−Di) + µi (4)
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were yiτ is a dummy equal to one if ticket i was paid within a time period of τ =
{15 days, 30 days, 60 days, any time} after it was received by the driver. si is the
measured speed at which the vehicle was driving at the time of the offense, Di is
a dummy that equals one if the vehicle’s speed is above the cutoff of 23km/h and
g(si) is a function that captures how yiτ varies with measured speed.
Table 3.6 summarizes the outcomes of the estimations. The table shows that
in fact, increasing the fine and the associated late-pay costs discouraged timely
payments and payments within 30 days after the speeding ticket was received. In
the language of Section 3.3, jointly increasing f and K by about 100%, reduces the
proportion of timely payments by 5.4 percentage points. This represents a 6.7%
drop in timely compliance relative to the proportion of payments made before the
deadline within 0.5km/h below the cutoff. This finding indicates that the reduction
on payments before the deadline resulting from a larger f , dominate the potential
positive effect on timely payments from increasing the costs of missing the deadline
(K).
Table 3.6: RDD Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payments: 15 days 30 days 60 days Any payment
Bias-corrected -0.054** -0.042* -0.012 -0.004
(0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023)
Y (left) 0.801 0.836 0.836 0.859
Relative effect -6.69% -5.08% -1.43% -0.48%
Effective obs. (left) 4451 4368 4676 4559
Effective obs. (right) 1771 1757 1802 1784
Optimal Bandwidth 4.030 3.978 4.150 4.083
Notes: The table presents bias-corrected RD estimates of (4) with robust variance
estimators (Calonico et al., 2014), implemented with the 2018/09 version of the
rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2017). All specifications use local linear point
estimators and local quadratic estimates for the bias correction. Effective number
of observations used to the left and the right of the 23km/h cutoff as well as MSE
optimal bandwidths estimated with a triangular kernel are indicated in the lower
panel of the table. Y (left) indicates the mean of the dependent variable in the
0.5km/h bin below the cutoff. The table also shows the effect size relative to the
mean outcome in the 0.5km/h bin below the cutoff, Number of observations in all
specifications is 50,524. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
The negative effect on payments from a larger f persists during the first month
after the speeding ticket is received, although with a smaller magnitude. Doubling
the fine and the late-pay costs reduces payments within this period by 4.2 pp (or
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5% relative to payments right below the cutoff). We do not find significant effects
when considering longer periods of time.
This set of results seem to be large when put into perspective with the outcomes
from the empirical analysis in the last section. On the one hand, doubling the amount
of the fine and the late-pay penalty reduced timely payments by 5.4 pp. On the
other hand, the most effective cover letter in the previous section (D&P) increased
payments before the deadline by 2 pp. This means that doubling the monetary
costs of the fine and the late-pay penalty produces an effect on timely compliance
that is almost three times larger, in absolute value, than the effect of providing a
simplifying cover letter that makes salient the deadline and the late-pay penalty.
These findings highlight the relative importance of purely economic incentives on
payment decisions with respect to a behaviorally motivated intervention.
3.6 Conclusion
We analyzed the effect of information simplification, attribute salience and economic
incentives on speeding ticket payments closely following a pre-analysis plan. Results
from a survey and a randomized control trial highlight the importance of salience
and simplification. Simplifying the information and jointly increasing the salience of
the deadline and the penalty for late payments leads to higher timely compliance and
overall speeding ticket payments than a low salience scenario. Separately making
salient either attribute barely has an effect on payments. Making the deadline
salient has no effect on payments in our setting, whereas increasing the salience of
the late-pay penalty has a modest positive effect on timely compliance.
Regression discontinuity design estimations document a much larger impact of
economic incentives on payment behavior than the salience intervention. Doubling
the fine and the penalty for late payments significantly reduce timely payments.
The absolute value of the effect from changes in economic incentives almost triples
that of the salience intervention. Our results highlight the potential of providing
simple information to correct for individuals’ mis-perceptions about decision-relevant
parameters as a cost-effective tool to enforce payments. This policy recommendation
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is of particular relevance given the tendency of governments around the world to use
overly complicated texts to enforce payments.
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3.7 Appendix: Theory
In Section 3.3 we discussed the comparative statics of a pre-deadline payment w.r.t.
the fine f . To derive the argument formally, note that the relevant cutoff for the
decision to pay in period T (conditional on not having paid before) is
− cT − f ≥ δVT+1 ⇐⇒ cT ≤ cˆT := − (f + δVT+1) . (5)
Note further that the discounted (δ) option value VT+1 is negative, which means
that cˆT will be typically positive (unless f is very large). In particular, under the
cutoff rule, the option value is given by
VT+1 =
∫ cˆT+1
0
(−c− f −K)dF (c) + (1− F (cˆT+1)) δVT+2, (6)
i.e., the probability of drawing a sufficiently low cost c and thus paying the fine f
plus the late-pay penalty K in T + 1 plus the probability of not paying in T + 1
times the option value of further postponing the payment into the future.
Applying Leibniz’s rule of integral differentiation to the cutoff cˆT defined in (5),
we obtain
∂cˆT
∂f
= −1− δ∂VT+1
∂f
= −1− δ
∫ cˆT+1
0
(−1− ∂K
∂f
)dF (c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+ (1− F (cˆT+1)) δ
∂VT+2
∂f︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(7)
+ (−cˆT+1 − f −K −
∂F (cˆT+1)
∂cˆT+1
)
∂cˆT+1
∂f︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
 .
Term A is clearly negative. Term B is negative, as long as the option value clearly
decreases as the payment obligation (here: f and, indirectly, K) increases. The
last term, C, would only be negative if ∂cˆT+1/∂f ≥ 0. The sum in the brackets
(A+B+C) is multiplied by −δ and would thus turn positive, potentially offsetting
the −1. In this case, one could obtain ∂cˆT/∂f > 0. Whenever ∂cˆT+1/∂f < 0,
however, the sum A + B + C could be positive (before multiplication with −δ).
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In this case, we would obtain ∂cˆT/∂f < 0. The comparative static is therefore
ambiguous.
3.8 Appendix: Complementary figures and tables
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative response rates by treatment
Note: the payment deadline (15 days) is indicated with the red verti-
cal line. The figure shows the cumulative response rate between the
3rd and the 21st day after receiving the summons, for each of the
treatment and control groups.
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Table 3.7: Survey descriptive statistics
Control Deadline Penalty Deadline & Total
penalty
Age 43.51 43.52 43.74 43.86 43.66
(15.03) (13.99) (13.80) (14.29) (14.28)
Male 0.510 0.523 0.481 0.500 0.503
(0.501) (0.500) (0.500) (0.501) (0.500)
Apprenticeship 0.381 0.450 0.406 0.405 0.410
education (0.486) (0.498) (0.492) (0.491) (0.492)
Elementary school 0.0842 0.0628 0.0529 0.0756 0.0690
education (0.278) (0.243) (0.224) (0.265) (0.254)
High school 0.324 0.339 0.355 0.329 0.337
education (0.469) (0.474) (0.479) (0.471) (0.473)
University or higher 0.210 0.148 0.186 0.190 0.184
education (0.408) (0.356) (0.390) (0.393) (0.388)
city of 100,000 + 0.223 0.206 0.219 0.227 0.219
inhabitants (0.417) (0.405) (0.414) (0.419) (0.414)
Notes: N=1609. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 3.5: Measured speed density plot for the full sample
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Note: The graph shows the distribution of measured speed centered
around the 23km/h speed limit threshold at which the severity of
the offense changes from low to medium, with the corresponding
95% confidence intervals. Estimates at the bottom of the figure are
from McCrary’s (2008) heaping test.
Salience, Simplification and Compliance 112
Figure 3.6: Measured speed density plot for the full sample
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Note: The graph shows the density plot of the running variable
in the RDD estimations for the full sample of the RCT. Measured
speed in the horizontal axis is centered at the 23km/h above the
speed limit threshold. Local polynomials of second degree with
95% confidence are depicted. Triangle kernel and MSE optimal
bandwidth selection procedures by Calonico et al. (2014) were used
in the estimation of the polynomials.
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Table 3.8: Treatment Effects on Expectations of Addition of Demerit Points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Responses: Yes No Maybe
Deadline 0.015 0.018 -0.072** -0.076** 0.057** 0.058**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) (0.027)
Penalty 0.308*** 0.309*** -0.300*** -0.301*** -0.008 -0.008
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024)
Deadline & penalty 0.310*** 0.311*** -0.298*** -0.299*** -0.012 -0.012
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant 0.324*** 0.287*** 0.535*** 0.567*** 0.141*** 0.146***
(0.023) (0.045) (0.025) (0.046) (0.017) (0.033)
F-Tests (p-values):
D = P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.013
D = D&P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.007
P = D&P 0.955 0.964 0.938 0.935 0.859 0.868
Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes
Notes: The table presents LPM estimates of equations following the structure from (1). N = 1,609.
The dependent variable in Columns (1) – (2) is a dummy indicating that an individual responded yes
to the question ‘If you do not pay the full amount of the fine by the deadline, would you expect to get
demerit points within the demerit point system?’. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) captures
responses indicating no. Columns (5) and (6) indicate responses of maybe. Control variables include age,
gender, and education dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 3.9: Probability of payment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payments: 60 days 100 days
Deadline 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Penalty 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Deadline & penalty 0.011* 0.010** 0.012** 0.011**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Constant 0.783*** 1.199*** 0.785*** 1.209***
(0.022) (0.032) (0.022) (0.031)
F-Tests (p-values):
D = P 0.633 0.436 0.544 0.335
D = D&P 0.110 0.015 0.074 0.007
P = D&P 0.224 0.078 0.193 0.059
Controls - Yes - Yes
Observations 50,524 47,852 50,524 47,852
Notes: The table presents LPM estimates of equations following the structure
from (2). All specifications contain dummies for the week the speeding ticket
was sent. Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered at the vehicle
level. Specifications (3) and (4) include a vector of variables controlling for
severity of the offense, plate number of the vehicle, day of the week when the
offense took place, holidays, number of days between the offense and both
ticket sending and reception, hour of the day, measured speed at the time
of the offense, amount of the fine, direction of the drive through (from or to
Prague), whether the ticket was sent through regular mail, whether the ticket
was issued to a vehicle that belongs to a company. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01.
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3.9 Appendix: Cover letters and summons
Cover letters
The texts used in the different cover letters was the following (English translation):
Deadline (D) treatment:
Dear Sir/Madam,
We summon you to pay the prescribed amount for a speeding violation. We encourage you
to carefully read the information contained in the attached pages and take appropriate
action.
Please pay the amount in full and make sure it is credited to the city’s account within
15 days after receiving this summons.
The city office of Ricany, legal division, department of fines
Penalty (P ) treatment:
Dear Sir/Madam,
We summon you to pay the prescribed amount for a speeding violation. We encourage you
to carefully read the information contained in the attached pages and take appropriate
action.
If you do not pay the whole amount the office will continue investigating the offense. The
amount that you will potentially have to pay may be as high as CZK 2,500.18 In
addition, the driver may be added points within the demerit point system.
The city office of Ricany, legal division, department of fines
18For medium-severity speeding violations (i.e., for a speed of more than 20km/h above the
limit), this part reads ‘as high as CZK 5,000’.
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Deadline & Penalty (D&P ) treatment:
Dear Sir/Madam,
We summon you to pay the prescribed amount for a speeding violation. We encourage you
to carefully read the information contained in the attached pages and take appropriate
action.
Please pay the amount in full and make sure it is credited to the city’s account within
15 days after receiving this summons.
If you do not pay the whole amount the office will continue investigating the offense. The
amount that you will potentially have to pay may be as high as CZK 2,500.19 In
addition, the driver may be added points within the demerit point system.
The city office of Ricany, legal division, department of fines
19This part is again adjusted for medium-severity speeding violations (see previous footnote).
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Standard notification
The next pages present the structure and layout of the standard legal notification
sent to all drivers in our trial. (English translation from the original in Czech).
Docket number: XXXX     Proceedings number: XXXX 
The town authority of Ricany  
Legal department,  
Office of speeding cameras and vehicle weights 
 
Contact official: name, phone     Car operator: name, address 
 
Date: 
 
Summons for the payment of a prescribed amount under § 125h, paragraph 1, of Act No. 
361/2000 Coll. on the Road Traffic and Amendments to Other Laws, as subsequently 
amended. 
The town authority of Říčany, legal department, office of traffic violations, as a town authority 
of a municipality with extended jurisdiction, competent to the administrative proceedings under 
the provision of § 125h, paragraph 1, of law nb. 361/2000 on the Road Traffic and 
Amendments to Other Laws, as subsequently amended (hereinafter “road traffic law”), 
summons the operator of vehicle with license plate 2SJ7260 (hereinafter “vehicle”), with 
which road traffic law was breached on 03.01.2016 at 14:57 on the road situated on street 
Říčanská (between streets Kolovratská and Březinova in the length of 335,360 metres) in the 
municipality of Říčany in the direction from Voděrádky, 
for the payment of sum 
amounting to 900 Kč (nine hundred Czech korunas) to the bank account 35-320390319/0800, 
variable symbol 9116001251, (message for the receiver: XXXXXXX), and to do so within 15 
days since the delivery of this summons. Kindly pay your attention to crediting the said account 
with the prescribed sum within the given time limit. 
The illegal act has been committed by an unspecified driver, who has not respected the traffic 
signs [INSERT: location-specific text describing the speed limit at a given location], by which 
he has violate the section [INSERT: specific paragraph of the road traffic law, depending on 
severity. ] This violation appears to satisfy the definition of an offense under the section 
[INSERT: the appropriate section] of the road traffic law. The offense has been documented by 
an automated speed measurement system [INSERT details pertaining to this offense.] 
Based on the findings of the town authority of Říčany, legal department, office of traffic 
violations, you are the operator of the vehicle with license plate XXXXXX and, according to 
the provision of § 10, paragraph 3 of the road traffic law you are obliged to ensure that, while 
using the vehicle on the road, all driver’s duties and road traffic rules are being followed as 
prescribed by this law.This particular offense constitutes a breach of the driver’s duties and, 
concurrently, of the road traffic rules. The offense which shows indicia of a violation under the 
road traffic law; there was no traffic accident. 
Because the above-mentioned offense may be, in accordance with the legal provisions, handled 
by a ticket procedure and, as it was previously mentioned, other conditions were also fulfilled 
for the special procedure of the administrative agency for the application of the strict liability 
of the vehicle operator under the provision of § 125h, paragraph 1 of the road traffic law, the 
prescribed amount of 900 Kč has a legal basis according to the provision of § 125h, paragraph 
2 of the road traffic law. 
 
 
Notice: 
1. If the prescribed amount is paid by the due date at the latest, i.e. if it is be credited to the 
said account within 15 days since the delivery of this summons, the town authority of 
Říčany, legal department, office of traffic violations, will defer the case in accordance 
with the provisions of § 125h, paragraph 5 of the road traffic law. Otherwise, it will 
proceed with the investigation of the offense. 
2. If the prescribed amount is paid after the due date, the town authority of Říčany, legal 
department, office of traffic violations, will, in accordance with the provisions of 
§ 125h, paragraph 7 of the road traffic law, immediately return it to the vehicle 
operator and will proceed with the investigation of the offense. 
3. Concurrently, in accordance with the provisions of § 125h, paragraph 6 of the road 
traffic law, we instruct you that if you do not pay the prescribed amount, you may report, 
in writing, the identity details of the vehicle’s driver who was driving the vehicle at the 
time of the offense to the town authority of Říčany, legal department, office of traffic 
violations, and you may do so within 15 days since the delivery of this summons. To 
report these details, you may use the attached form. Providing the identity details of the 
driver is considered, according to the provision of § 125h, paragraph, a submission of 
an explication. 
4. In case that you neither pay the prescribed amount nor make use of your right to report 
the details of the identity of the vehicle’s driver nor provide any other explanation within 
the given time limit, the town authority of Říčany, legal department, office of traffic 
violations, will proceed with the investigation of the offense. 
If you regard it necessary to provide an oral explanation on record, you may visit our 
authority’s office during the office hours (Monday and Wednesday 07:30-12:00 and 12:30-
18:00; Tuesday and Thursday: 07:30-12:00) at Olivova 1800, Říčany. 
Upon the payment of the prescribed amount, there are no penalty points imposed on 
the vehicle operator within the framework of the demerit point system of drivers 
under the provision of § 123a to § 123f of the road traffic law. This summons is not an 
administrative adjudication. Appeal against this summons is not admissible. 
 
        Contact officials’ signatures. 
Attachments: 
• Photo from the location of the speed measurement  
• Form for the identity details of the vehicle driver at the time of the offense 
• Postal money order 
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Original standard notification
The next pages present an example of the original standard legal notification in
Czech sent to all drivers in our trial
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